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Interest Analysis and Forum
Preference in the Conflict of
Laws: A Response to the
'New Critics'
by Robert A. Sedler*
INTRODUCTION
This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the publication of the
late Brainerd Currie's collected writings on the conflict of laws.' Twenty
years have also passed since the decision of the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Babcock v. Jackson,2 which ignited the 'modern revolution' of
choice of law in this country. The coincidence of the publication of Cur-
rie's collected writings and the decision in Babcock is, in retrospect, quite
significant. The governmental interest approach formulated by Currie has
indeed been the catalyst of the choice of law revolution and continues to
be the focal point of the debate over the preferred approach to choice of
law. Although this debate continues apace and a number of other 'modern
approaches' to choice of law have been developed,3 in practice the courts
that have abandoned the traditional approach 4 generally employ interest
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. University of Pittsburgh (A.B., 1956; J.D.,
1959). Member, State Bars of Kentucky and Michigan, Bar of the District of Columbia.
1. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
2. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
3. For a review of these approaches, see R. SEDLER & R. CRAMTON, SUM AND SUBSTANCE
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 5.0000-.4000, 7.0000-.4000 (2d ed. 1981).
4. My current count, in alphabetical order, indicates that of the fifty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, thirty-one have adopted a modern approach, at least in torts cases.
Twenty-seven had done so by 1977. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska
1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d
551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514
P.2d 314 (1973); Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d
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analysis to resolve choice of law problems regardless of which 'modern
approach' to choice of law they are purportedly following.5 Moreover,
42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Witherspoon v. Salm, 142 Ind. App. 655, 237 N.E.2d 116 (1968), -
rev'd on other grounds, 251 Ind. 575, 243 N.E.2d 876 (1969); Berghammer v. Smith, 185
N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1971); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Jagers v. Royal
Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970);
Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358 N.E.2d 416 (Mass. 1976); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel Co., 249 Minn.
376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Kennedy v.
Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439
(1963); Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970); Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Issendorf v. Olsen, 194 N.W.2d 750
(N.D. 1972); Fox v. Morrison, 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971); Brickner v.
Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'g Co., 247 Or. 274, 428
P.2d 898 (1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Woodward v.
Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Marra v. Bushes,
447 F.2d 1282 (2d Cir. 1972) (predicting Vermont choice of law rules); Werner v. Werner, 84
Wash. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408
(1965). See also Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial
Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sedler,
Rules] (a comprehensive analysis of the choice of law methods of American courts in torts
cases). By 1979, two more states had abandoned the traditional approach. See Wallis v. Mrs.
Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312
(Tex. 1979); Sedler, On Choice of Law and the Great Quest: A Critique of Special Multis-
tate Solutions to Choice-of-Law Problems, 7 HOFSTsA L. REv. 807 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Sedler, Critique]. Florida adopted a modern approach in 1980. See Bishop v. Florida
Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980). The most. recent states to abandon the
traditional approach are Hawaii, Idaho, and Michigan. See Peters v. Peters, 63 Hawaii 653,
634 P.2d 586 (1981); DeMeyer v. Maxwell, 103 Idaho 327, 647 P.2d 783 (1982); Sexton v.
Ryder Truck Rental, 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843 (1982). Sixteen states continue to ad-
here to the traditional approach. See Spencer v. Malone Freight Lines, 292 Ala. 582, 298 So.
2d 20 (1974); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Friday v. Smoot, 58
Del. 488, 211 A.2d 594 (1965); Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 133 Ga. App. 378,
210 S.E.2d 854 (1974); McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965); Brady v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 254 Md. 598, 255 A.2d 427 (1969); Lorenzen v. Continental
Baking Co., 180 Neb. 23, 141 N.W.2d 163 (1966); First Nat'l Bank v. Benson, 89 N.M. 481,
553 P.2d 1288 (1976); Petrea v. Ryder Tank Lines, 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965);
Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194
N.W.2d 164 (1972); Winters v. Maxey, 481 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972); Rhoades v. Wrih, 622
P.2d 343 (Utah 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va.
1127, 253 S.E.2d 662 (1979); Chase v. Greyhound Lines, 195 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1973); Duke
v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979); Sedler, Rules, supra at
975-76 n.2. Two states, Montana and Nevada, have not directly addressed the issue. See
Sedler, Rules, supra at 975-76 n.2.
5. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to
Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181, 227-33 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach]. For the practice of the
courts in conflicts cases, see also the discussion in Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well- Watered
Plateau, 41 LAw & CoNrEmp. PRoBs. 10 (1977). Professor Leflar maintains that "[miost of
the current cases follow a pattern of multiple citation, seldom relying solely upon any single
modern choice-of-law theory, but combining two or more of the theories to produce results
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when presented with what Currie terms the 'true conflict'-the situation
in which the forum and the other involved state both have a real interest
in applying their own law in order to implement the policy reflected in
that law'-the forum, again regardless of its purported approach to
choice of law or its purported method of resolving true conflicts, generally
will end up applying its own law, as Currie advocates.7 To put it another
way, the results reached by the courts in the cases coming before them
for decision are generally consistent with the interest analysis approach to
choice of law as developed by Currie and refined by his followers.'
As a follower and staunch defender of Currie's interest analysis ap-
proach, I have previously responded to what may be called the standard
criticisms of interest analysis, such as the alleged difficulty in determining
the policies and interests of the involved states,' the failure to take ac-
count of policies other than those expressed in substantive law rules,'0 the
supposed ad hoc nature of the approach," and the claimed illegitimacy of
the forum's preference for its own policies and interests in the case of the
true conflict.'" I have also contended that interest analysis has been em-
pirically demonstrated to be the preferred approach to choice of law be-
cause the courts, who are in fact applying that approach, generally reach
functionally sound and fair, results in the cases coming before them for
decision. 3 Professor Kay has recently made a similar defense of interest
analysis as a basic approach to the resolution of choice of law problems."
The 'old critics' have not been persuaded and continue to press their
attacks, both on interest analysis as a basic approach to choice of law and
which, interestingly, can be sustained under any or nearly all of the new non-mechanical
approaches to conflicts law." Id. at 10.
6. Concerning the matter of "real interests," see the discussion in Sedler, Governmental
Interest Approach, supra note 5, at 222-27.
7. Id. at 231-33.
8. For my own reformulation of Currie's interest analysis for use by the courts in the
day-to-day process of deciding actual cases, see id. at 220-36.
9. Id. at 194-204. See also the discussion in Sedler, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws
Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1628, 1631-35 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Sedler,
Reflections].
10. Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5, at 192-94. See also infra
text accompanying notes 124-150.
11. Id. at 208-16. For a discussion of the resolution of conflicts problems on a case by
case method in relation to judicial method, see generally Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Ken-
tucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27, 82-87
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Judicial Method].
12. Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5, at 227-33.
13. Sedler, Reflections, supra note 9, at 1628-31. See also the discussion in Sedler, Cri-
tique, supra note 4, at 808-13.
14. Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evalua-
tion of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 577 (1980).
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on the principle of forum preference.1" More significantly, within the last
few years 'new critics' have appeared. They have advanced new argu-
ments challenging the underlying rationale of interest analysis and have
sought to demonstrate that interest analysis is not "tenable"16 as a basic
approach to the resolution of choice of law problems. Professor McDou-
gal has developed an approach of "comprehensive interest analysis, "17
which, unlike Currie's interest analysis, is designed to take into account
and accommodate all relevant interests, and to develop trans-state solu-
tions to conflicts problems. Professor Brilmayer maintains that interest
analysis is based on "constructive legislative intent" and contends that
"constructive legislative intent" cannot be relied upon to provide sound
solutions to choice of law problems. 8 Dean Ely, a leading constitutional
scholar, says that interest analysis is premised on a state's preference for
its own residents," and has subjected this aspect of interest analysis to
constitutional scrutiny. He says that it may not be able to withstand such
scrutiny and that if it cannot, interest analysis cannot survive as a basic
approach to choice of law.20
My intention in the present writing is to respond to these 'new critics'
15. For a representative sampling, see generally Hay, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws
Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1644, 1659-64 (1981); Reese, American Trends in Private
International Law: Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Torts
Cases, 33 VAND. L. REv. 717, 719-24 (1980); Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law
Rules, 81 COLuM. L. REv. 946, 947-51 (1981); Trautman, Concluding Remarks, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 1678, 1679-80 (1981); Trautman, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1612, 1614-16 (1981); Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System
Shock and Constitutional Choice of Law, 10 HOFsTRA L. REV. 149, 158-68 (1981); von Meh-
ren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 27, 32-39 (1977).
16. The term "tenable" was used by the editors of the Hastings Law Journal in pro-
pounding the questions for its Dialogue: Does an approach "create a tenable method for
deciding choice-of-law issues?" Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology: A Dialogue,
32 HASTINGS L.J. 1609, 1610 (1981). I find the term particularly helpful in referring to the
validity of a basic approach to the resolution of choice of law problems.
17. The two works that I will refer to in the present article are McDougal, Comprehen-
sive Interest Analysis Versus Reformulated Governmental Interest Analysis: An Ap-
praisal in the Context of Choice-of-Law Problems Concerning Contributory and Compara-
tive Negligence, 26 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 439 (1979) [hereinafter cited as McDougal,
Comprehensive Interest Analysis]; McDougal, The New Frontier in Choice of Law-Trans-
State Laws: The Need Demonstrated in Theory and in the Context of Motor Vehicle
Guest-Host Controversies, 53 TuL. L. REV. 731 (1979) [hereinafter cited as McDougal, The
New Frontier]. See also McDougal, Choice of Law: Prologue to a Viable Interest-Analysis
Theory, 51 Ttm. L. Rav. 207 (1977); McDougal, The Process of Trans-State Agree-
ment: Claims Concerning Oral Agreements, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 367 (1978).
18. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. Rav.
392 (1980).
19. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 173 (1981).
20. Id. at 180-91.
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and in the process of so doing to demonstrate precisely why interest anal-
ysis is the preferred approach to the resolution of choice of law problems.
I maintain that interest analysis is the preferred approach because it
will provide functionally sound and fair solutions to the choice of law is-
sues that arise in actual cases.2 I focus on the matter of functionally
sound and fair solutions to the choice of law issues that arise in actual
cases because of my view of the purpose of conflicts law and the role of a
court in deciding a conflicts case.
It is my view that the purpose of conflicts law is to provide functionally
sound and fair solutions for those relatively few cases that arise in prac-
tice in which a court has to make a choice of law decision. A court has to
make a choice of law decision in an actual case only when (1) the case is
connected with more than one state and (2) the laws of the involved
states differ on the point in issue.2 2 These cases are relatively few in num-
ber for two reasons. First, despite the fact that we live in a multistate
world, most transactions, and thus most cases that arise in practice, are
connected with only one state. Second, even when a case is connected
with more than one state, most of the time the laws of the involved states
will not differ on the point in issue. I am fond of saying that the law is
alike except where it is different. With few exceptions, conflicts cases aris-
ing in American courts are interstate cases,22 and a conflict between dif-
fering common-law rules of two American states in an actual case is virtu-
ally nonexistent.2 4 Whenever a conflict of laws exists between two
American states, it is almost invariably because one state has enacted a
21. See supra note 13.
22. I use the two-state example because almost invariably this is what is involved in an
actual case. In the rare case in which three states are involved, two of the state's laws on the
point in issue will be the same. See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 31 (1967).
23. I consider a case involving an American state and a Canadian province essentially an
interstate case. Because most of the conflicts cases arising in American courts are interstate
cases, American conflicts law has developed with reference to the interstate case. Interna-
tional cases are accommodated within the framework established for interstate cases, al-
though presumably relevant differences would be taken into account by the court. See, e.g.,
Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974). Cf.
Loebig v. Larucci, 572 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1978) (New York law applied in the absence of proof
of contrary German law).
24. Such a conflict was assumed for purposes of the particular case in Barrett v. Foster
Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1971), in which the court assumed a difference between
the New Hampshire and Massachusetts common-law rules on the duties owed by a land-
owner to a visitor on the land. The assumption was that New Hampshire imposed a higher
duty of care than that embodied in the general common-law rule. The court held that Mas-
sachusetts law applied, so it was not necessary to decide whether in fact there was a differ-
ence between the common-law rules of the involved states. I have not come across any other
examples of even a possible difference in applicable common-law rules.
1983]
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statute that changes the common-law rule remaining in force in the other
state, for example, the guest statute situation25 or in an area regulated by
statute, such as wrongful death, a situation in which the statutes of the
involved states differ in material respects. Even when a case is connected
with more than one state, therefore, in practice the case usually will not
present a choice of law issue. Thus, there simply will be relatively few
conflicts cases in practice."6
The conflicts cases that do arise are not inherently difficult to decide.
The great majority of these cases are in the torts area, and for reasons
that I have explained elsewhere, the cases tend to fall into certain fact-
law patterns.2 7 There is relative agreement among the courts on how the
choice of law issues should be resolved in each fact-law pattern, and the
courts have reached fairly uniform results in these cases regardless of the
particular modern approach to choice of law that they purportedly fol-
low.28 Conflicts contracts cases also can be put into certain fact-law pat-
terns,29 and the cases that arise in practice tend to involve recurring
problems, such as the statute of frauds, built-in limitation periods, and
claims of usury. Conflicts cases in the property area are virtually nonexis-
tent. Thus, not only are there relatively few conflicts cases that arise in
practice, but those that do arise involve a limited number of choice of law
issues.
For all of these reasons, I submit that the focus of conflicts law should
be on the cases that actually do arise in practice and that the purpose of
conflicts law should be to provide functionally sound and fair solutions in
those cases. The real world in which conflicts law operates is all too often
ignored by academic commentators. I have always believed that academic
commentators tend to take an unduly complex view of the choice of law
process 0 and tend to have a rather grandiose conception about the func-
tion of conflicts law in our legal system. This tendency may explain in
25. When a court adopts comparative negligence as a common-law rule, there would be
conflict between common-law rules if the other state retained the traditional common-law
rule of contributory negligence. Since comparative negligence, however, generally is pro-
vided for by statute, this is akin to a difference between a statute that changes the common-
law rule and the remaining common-law rule in the other state.
26. In the typical accident or contract case that cuts across state lines, there will be no
conflicts problems because the applicable substantive law involves general principles of neg-
ligence or contract law. The laws of the involved states, therefore, will not differ on the
point in issue.
27. Sedler, Rules, supra note 4 at 980-81.
28. Id. at 1032-41.
29. Id. at 980 n.29.
30. This complex view of the choice of law process sometimes carries over to the courts
when they provide a rationale for their choice of law decisions. Opinions in conflicts
cases-perhaps because these cases are so rare-tend to be written as if each case were a
landmark decision.
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part the aversion of so many of them to interest analysis as a basic ap-
proach to the resolution of conflicts problems. Interest analysis will gen-
erally produce functionally sound and fair results in practice because it
simplifies the choice of law process by focussing on what seems to the
courts to be the most rational consideration in making choice of law deci-
sions: the policies reflected in a state's rule of substantive law and a
state's interest in applying its law to implement those policies in the par-
ticular case. 1 My submission, then, is that interest analysis is the pre-
ferred approach to the solution of conflicts problems because it facilitates
the court's task in reaching functionally sound and fair solutions in actual
cases. It is within this framework that I will respond to the 'new critics.'
I. THE 'NEW CRITICS'
A. McDougal: Comprehensive Interest Analysis
Professor McDougal says that the interest analysis approach, both as
originally developed by Currie and as I have reformulated it, is concep-
tually inadequate because it fails to "consider sufficiently all relevant in-
terests at stake in choice-of-law controversies." 2 He goes on:
[B]oth [Currie's original approach and my reformulation] give undue
deference to the law of the forum; both fail to recognize that courts
should and must weigh competing and conflicting interests; and both fail
to provide for the development and application of trans-state laws when
such laws are essential to an appropriate accommodation of the interests,
at stake in particular choice-of-law controversies."
McDougal then states his position on the importance of multistate
interests:
The states in this country are not isolated political and economic units;
they are an inextricably interwoven community. Each state, and all
states, will benefit in the long run from the promotion of these multistate
31. It will be recalled that the underlying justification for interest analysis as developed
by Brainerd Currie was that it would provide rational solutions to choice of law problems.
Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE L.J. 171, 171-
78, reprinted in B. CURRm, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFICT OF LAWS, 177, 177-84 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Currie, Methods and Objectives]. [Editor's Note: Since most of Cur-
rie's articles are reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, a corresponding
page reference to this work will appear throughout this article in brackets immediately after
the citation to the appropriate page in Currie's originally published article.]
32. McDougal, Comprehensive Interest Analysis, supra note 17, at 440 (emphasis in
original).
33. Id.
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policies. Because these multistate policies, and the interests they reflect,
are so important, a choice-of-law theory should require their identifica-
tion and consideration in every choice-of-law controversy.'
Given McDougal's premise that "choice-of-law decisions should be made
with reference to multistate policies and all the policies and interests of
the involved states, '8 5 the Currie version of interest analysis is necessarily
inadequate (1) because it looks only to the policies reflected in the sub-
stantive laws of the involved states and the interest of each state in ap-
plying its law to implement those policies; (2) because it contains an un-
due preference for forum law, in that forum law applies whenever the
forum has a real interest in applying its law in order to implement the
policy reflected in that law; (3) because it does not provide for a weighing
of conflicting interests; and (4) because it does not provide for trans-state
solutions going beyond the application of the substantive rule of one of
the involved states.,6
Under McDougal's comprehensive interest analysis, a court presented
with a choice of law issue should proceed as follows. First, it should iden-
tify all relevant interests of the "significantly affected" states. 7 These in-
terests include not only the policies reflected in rules of substantive law,
but common interests of all states that are "relevant to trans-state
events" 8" and interests "expressed in terms of applicable community
goals and policies." Next, the court should examine all identified inter-
ests to make sure that "none is incompatible with basic community poli-
cies. "40 Finally, the court should make an "accommodation of all relevant
interests in a manner that will best promote net aggregate long-term com-
mon interests."" This accommodation may include applying a legal rule
to the resolution of the controversy that is independent of the particular
substantive law rules of either of the involved states. As McDougal con-
tends: "If the laws designed to resolve intrastate controversies are un-
necessarily destructive of the interests at stake, then the court should
construct or ascertain another law that will appropriately accommodate
the interests at stake and apply such a trans-state law."' 2
McDougal has illustrated the application of comprehensive interest
analysis in the areas of contributory fault and the guest statute defense.
34. Id. at 449.
35. Id. at 451.
36. Id. at 447-53.
37. He prefers this phrase to the phrase, "involved states," which I use. Id. at 454 n.70.
38. Id. at 454 n.73.
39. Id. at 455.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 456.
42. Id.
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In both instances, after applying comprehensive interest analysis, he con-
cludes that the preferred trans-state solution is to allow the plaintiff to
recover. In the area of contributory fault, he would allow recovery on the
basis of defendant's degree of negligence,'4 and in the guest statute situa-
tion, he would deny the defense." The preferred trans-state solution
would allow recovery, even if recovery would be barred under the laws of
both the involved states.'8 As he puts it: "[C]ourts should strive to re-
solve these controversies in a manner that will best promote net aggregate
long-term common interests; the application of intrastate laws of particu-
lar states may not produce such decisions in trans-state controversies.' 6
The essential premise of McDougal's comprehensive interest analysis
approach and his criticism of Currie's interest analysis for not accepting
that premise raise most strikingly the question of the proper role of a
court in a conflicts case and the purpose of conflicts law in our legal sys-
tem. McDougal's premise is that choice of law decisions should be made
with reference to "multistate policies," "all the policies and interests of
the involved states," and "common interests of all states that are relevant
to trans-state transactions.' This premise relates to his view of the pur-
pose of conflicts law in our legal system, and here he adopts the view set
forth in the Restatement Second: "Probably the most important func-
tion of choice-of-law rules is to make the interstate and international sys-
tems work well. Choice-of-law rules, among other things,-should seek to
further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate commercial
intercourse between them."'"
As stated at the outset of this writing, I disagree completely with Mc-
Dougal's view of the purpose of conflicts law in our legal system. The
purpose of conflicts law is not to further harmonious relations and to fa-
cilitate commercial intercourse between states, nor is it to promote multi-
state policies. It is, as I have said, to provide functionally sound and fair
results in those relatively few cases arising in practice that are connected
with more than one state when the laws of the involved states differ on
the point in issue.
43. The party who was more at fault, for example, the party who was 60% negligent,
would pay 60% of the damages suffered by the other party. Id. at 470-73.
44. Such a solution, says McDougal, "promotes the exclusive and inclusive interests in
rehabilitating victims whose injury is the product of another's negligent conduct and the
exclusive and inclusive interests in minimizing unauthorized conduct." McDougal, The New
Frontier, supra note 17, at 753-54.
45. In this circumstance, recovery would be denied under interest analysis and any other
approach to the resolution of conflicts problems.
46. McDougal, Comprehensive Interest Analysis, supra note 17, at 473.
47. Id. at 453-57.
48. Id. at 448-49 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment d
(1971)).
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MERCER LAW REVIEW
The reason that the purpose of conflicts law is not as grandiose as Mc-
Dougal believes is that the decisions of courts in conflicts cases will have
no effect whatsoever on harmonious relations between states or on com-
mercial intercourse between them precisely because these cases are so few
in number. Even assuming the existence of multistate policies, those poli-
cies will in no way be impaired if they are not taken into account in de-
ciding what law to apply in a conflicts case.
Let me illustrate this point by a consideration of the practical effect of
the oft-criticized case of Lilienthal v. Kaufman.49 There, it will be recal-
led, the Oregon court, explicitly following Currie's interest analysis, ap-
plied the Oregon spendthrift immunity rule to protect an Oregon spend-
thrift from liability on a contract made in California with a California
plaintiff. The case has been criticized as improperly defeating the expec-
tations of the California creditor and ignoring the multistate policies of
encouraging commercial transactions.50 Regardless of whether these criti-
cisms are well taken, one may ask what the practical effect of the decision
in Lilienthal will be on harmonious relations between California and Ore-
gon or on commercial intercourse between residents of Oregon and re-
sidents of California. The answer is obvious: It will have no effect what-
soever. In terms of normal commercial behavior, the situation presented
in Lilienthal was an aberration. Very few people in Oregon are likely to
be declared spendthrifts, and of those who are, very few would be able to
induce someone in California or elsewhere to enter into commercial trans-
actions with them. Californians will not be hesitant to deal with Oregoni-
ans because of the extremely remote possibility that the Oregonian may
turn out to be a spendthrift. At most, they will be more careful when they
run credit checks on potential Oregon contractors.51 And surely no one
could say with a straight face that "harmonious relations" between Cali-
fornia and Oregon will be adversely affected by a decision rendered by an
Oregon court in a case that is unlikely ever to arise again. The grandiose
conception about the purpose of conflicts law that Professor McDougal
proffers simply has no relation to the real world. The decision of a court
in a particular conflicts case, or for that matter, all the decisions of all the
49. 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
50. See, e.g., D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 192 (1965); Reese, Legislative Ju-
risdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1597 (1978); von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-
Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 927, 938 (1975). I maintain that Lilienthal was cor-
rectly decided. See the discussions in Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note
5, at 231; Sedler, Characterization, Identification of.the Problem Area, and the Policy-
Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2 Rurr.-CAm. L. Rav. 8, 80-81
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Characterization].
51. In Lilienthal a credit check had been run, but it had failed to turn up any evidence
of the debtor's incompetency. Currie, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rv.
595, 603-04 (1968).
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courts in all- the conflicts cases that arise, will have no effect at all on
"harmonious relations between states" or on "commercial intercourse be-
tween them." The cases are simply too few in number to make any
difference. 2
So much of the conflicts literature and academic efforts to develop new
approaches to choice of law proceed on a grandiose conception of the pur-
pose of conflicts law in our legal system. Little if any effort is made,
however, to explain the basis for this grandiose conception or to assess
the practical effect of courts' decisions in conflicts cases on the considera-
tions that the academic commentators deem important.
Perhaps the academic commentators may be able to learn something
from the behavior of the courts in conflicts cases. If we look to what the
courts do in conflicts cases, it is clear that they see the purpose of con-
flicts law to provide functionally sound and fair results in those relatively
few conflicts cases coming before them for decision. The courts simply
have not evidenced any concern for promoting multistate policies and
have not indicated that they see their decisions in a conflicts case as hav-
ing any impact on harmonious relations between states or facilitating
commercial intercourse or accommodating the interests of the interstate
and international legal order. They have not done so because they do not
share the academic commentators' grandiose conception of the purpose of
conflicts law in our legal system or the role of the court in a conflicts case.
In a conflicts case, as in any other, the courts' primary concern is with
achieving a functionally sound and fair result in the particular case.
Lilienthal is a good example of the courts' behavior in a conflicts case.
In an earlier domestic case involving the same defendant, the Oregon
court had held that the contracts of a person declared to be a spendthrift
could be avoided by the guardian. 3 The consequences of imposing liabil-
ity would be felt by the spendthrift and his family in Oregon, regardless
of whether the contract was centered in California or Oregon and regard-
less of whether plaintiff was an Oregonian or Californian. Since, in terms
of the policies sought to be implemented by Oregon's rule of spendthrift
immunity, Oregon's interest in applying its law to implement those poli-
cies was the same in the conflicts case as in the domestic case, it seemed
quite reasonable to the Oregon court to apply its own law in the conflicts
52. In a similar vein, Professor Reese has taken me to task for advocating that the forum
should apply its own law to allow recovery to a forum resident injured in an out-of-state
accident involving a defendant from a nonrecovery state. Professor Reese says that if this
view were followed, it would "inevitably result in an increase in insurance rates throughout
the country as a whole." Reese, supra note 15, at 724. It would not have this effect, simply
because the number of such cases "throughout the country as a whole" are too few to have a
statistically significant effect on insurance rates in the aggregate.
53. Olshen v. Kaufman, 235 Or. 423, 437-38, 385 P.2d 161, 164 (1963).
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case as well. The result is in no sense unfair to the California creditor,
whose surprise at being unable to enforce the contract probably was no
greater than that of the disappointed Oregon creditor. One party to a
transaction always takes the risk that the other party to the transaction
will turn out to be incompetent, and since the California creditor knew
that defendant was an Oregonian,5 4 it was foreseeable at the time of the
transaction that defendant might turn out to be incompetent under Ore-
gon law. Thus, the result in Lilienthal certainly was a reasonable result
for the Oregon court to reach, in light of Oregon's interest in applying its
law to implement the policy reflected in that law and the absence of un-
fairness to defendant resulting from the application of Oregon law in the
particular case.
5 6
The courts, then, view their role in a conflicts case to be achievement of
a functionally sound and fair result in the case before them and see the
purpose of conflicts law to be directed toward that objective. The empha-
sis is on the case before the court. In some conflicts cases, a concern for
achieving a functionally sound and fair result will dictate that the forum's
own law be displaced on one or more issues in the case. This will occur
primarily when the forum has no real interest in applying its law on the
point in issue. When the forum has no real interest in applying its own
law on a particular point and another state does, the application of the
forum's law would not be considered to produce a functionally sound re-
sult in that case." The application of the forum's law would not produce
a fair result in a particular case if the party against whom the law is
sought to be applied could not have foreseen the application of that law
at the time the act in question occurred. In the cases that arise in prac-
tice, however, the same circumstances that would make the application of
the forum's law fundamentally unfair usually will indicate that the forum
54. The creditor even ran an ineffective credit check on him in Oregon.
55. On the other hand, if an Oregon party entered into an oral contract with a California
party, to be performed entirely in California, and the Oregon party sought to avoid enforce-
ment of the contract on the ground that it violated the Oregon statute of frauds, the appli-
cation of Oregon law on this issue would be fundamentally unfair to the California party.
The statute of frauds represents a transaction-regulating policy, and a state's interest in
applying its statute of frauds to implement that policy is predicated on substantial connec-
tions with the underlying transaction. The California party, entering into a contract con-
nected entirely with California, would have no reason to anticipate the application of the
law of the other party's home state on this issue. In such a situation, Oregon would have no
interest in applying its statute of frauds to implement the transaction-regulating policy re-
flected in that law and would not do so. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Charac-
terization, supra note 50, at 83-84.
56. In actual practice, there are numerous cases in which the forum has not applied its
own law on the ground that it had no real interest in doing so, while another state did. This
illustrates the classic 'false conflict' situation. See the discussion and examples in Sedler,
Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5, at 223-27.
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has no real interest in applying its law on the point in issue, and choice of
law decisions generally are not based on fundamental unfairness
grounds."
The fundamental problem with McDougal's comprehensive interest
analysis, then, is that it proceeds on an erroneous view of the purpose of
conflicts law in our legal system and of the proper role of the court in a
conflicts case. Precisely because it proceeds on this erroneous assumption,
it cannot help but produce results that the courts will and should con-
sider to be functionally unsound. This point is illustrated by McDougal's
"preferred trans-state solution" to questions of comparative fault and
guest statute liability. It may well be, as McDougal says, that to allow
recovery based on comparative fault and without regard to guest passen-
ger status will advance some notion of multistate policies by "maximally
promot[ing] the exclusive and inclusive interests [both] in minimizing un-
authorized conduct" 8 and, within the confines of the existing loss distri-
bution system, in rehabilitating victims. To advance multistate policies,
however, is simply not the responsibility of a court in a conflicts case. Its
responsibility is to achieve a functionally sound and fair result in the case
before it. If both the plaintiff and the defendant are from a contributory
fault state and the accident occurs in either of their home states or in
another contributory fault state, a functionally sound and fair result in
that case is to deny recovery to the victim. Since all of the involved states
agree on the substantive result in this case and since the same result
would obtain in a purely domestic case in either state, it would not ap-
pear to a court to be functionally sound to arrive at a different result
merely because the parties reside in different contributory fault states.
Comprehensive interest analysis, as proposed by McDougal, completely
misperceives the purpose of conflicts law and the role of the court in a
conflicts case. For that reason, it will not and should not be accepted by
the courts.
Interest analysis, on the other hand, recognizes that the purpose of con-
flicts law is to provide functionally sound and fair results in those con-
flicts cases that come before the courts for decision. It focusses on the
particular case and on the policies and interests of the involved states, as
they appear in that case. Precisely because interest analysis as a basic
approach is congruent with what the courts see to be the purpose of con-
flicts law and their proper role in a conflicts case, interest analysis is in
practice applied by the courts to resolve the choice of law problems that
come before them.
57. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra
note 5, at 222.
58. McDougal, Comprehensive Interest Analysis, supra note 17, at 472.
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B. Brilmayer: The Matter of "Constructive Legislative Intent"
Professor Brilmayer's criticism of interest analysis as a basic approach
to choice of law revolves around the matter of "constructive legislative
intent."'5 9 She says that interest analysis is based on a claim of "fidelity to
legislative intent" 0 and that since actual legislative intent usually cannot
be determined," interest analysis must of necessity "fall back on con-
structive intent."62 According to her, "constructive legislative intent"
means that "a rational legislature would, upon reflection, prefer the re-
sults of interest analysis to those of competing conflicts methodologies.""3
She then seeks to demonstrate that "the features that have made interest
analysis unpalatable to many commentators-in particular, its unpredict-
ability and parochialism-also leave it unconvincing as a species of con-
structive intent."
64
Professor Brilmayer contends that legislators want the scope of appli-
cation of the laws they enact to be "predictable" and that legislatures do
not enact laws based only on favoritism for forum residents.6 6 In addition,
she argues that "domestic interpretation and conflicts interpretation are
different enterprises altogether. 6 6 Finally, she notes that whenever legis-
latures have specified the application of a statute in the interstate con-
text, they generally have taken a territorialist approach.6 7  Professor
Brilmayer concludes:
When a legislature has not indicated the territorial scope of a statute in
either the words enacted or in the legislative history, it is a fiction to
speak of "legislative intent." If my analysis of what the calculus of inter-
ests requires is erroneous, the interest analysts should clarify the a priori
principles upon which their theory necessarily rests. Even better, they
would do well to cease making extravagant claims about fulfilling legisla-
tors' wishes, and get to work on a theory of constructive interpretation
that at least comports with demonstrated legislative concerns."
I think that Professor Brilmayer simply misapprehends the nature of the
59. Brilmayer, supra note 18.
60. Id. at 392.
61. Id. at 393. This is because, as she says, "in the vast majority of cases, legislatures
have no actual intent on territorial reach." Id. (emphasis in original). I would agree.
62. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 393.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 402.
65. See her discussion, id. at 402-17.
66. Id. at 417.
67. See her discussion, id. at 424-29. For a similar view from the perspective of a law
professor who is also a state legislator, see Davies, A Legislator's Look at Hague and Choice
of Law, 10 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 171, 174-82 (1981).
68. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 430-31.
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interest analysis approach. When the nature of that approach is properly
understood, it is clear that the approach is in no sense based on construc-
tive legislative intent.
In contending that interest analysis is based on constructive legislative
intent, Professor Brilmayer cites certain statements made by Currie, but
she ignores completely the context in which those statements were made.
She puts parts of two quotations together, and it comes out as fol-
lows: "It is explicitly an attempt to determine legislative purposes ....
[Tihe method I advocate is the method of statutory construction." 9
From these pieced-together snippets, Professor Brilmayer has concluded
that interest analysis is necessarily premised on "fidelity to legislative
intent.
70
Now let us see what Currie said in its entirety, with the quotation
taken by Professor Brilmayer in italics. First, there is the "method of
statutory construction." Here, Currie was responding to a criticism by
Professor Hill," and Currie's full response was as follows:
To one of Mr. Hill's charges I plead guilty without reservation. In the
first sentence of his essay he attributes to me the proposal that tradi-
tional methods of choice of law be abandoned in favor of a method "in-
volving the effectuation of relevant governmental policies on what ap-
pears to be an ad hoc basis." "Ad hoc" has a deprecatory connotation
that was no doubt intended. But the method I advocate is the method of
statutory construction, and of interpretation of common-law rules, to de-
termine their applicability to mixed cases. While there are some general
principles to guide us, statutory construction must always be an ad hoc
process. The distinctive virtue of the common-law system is that it also
proceeds on an ad hoc basis. I am proud to associate myself with the
common-law tradition. We have too long supposed that conflict-of-laws
problems can be solved in accordance with a code, transplanted from the
continent of Europe, which takes no account of the policies involved in
statutes and rules, nor even of the content of the laws that are competing
for recognition. It is time to return to methods that are indigenous to our
legal system and that our judges and lawyers are fully competent to util-
ize by reason of their training and experience."
69. Id. at 392 n.1 (quoting Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963
DuKE L.J. 1, 40 [690, 7271 [hereinafter cited as Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion] and
Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. CHI. L.
REv. 258, 295 [584, 627] (1961) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Quiescent Years]).
70. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 392.
71. Hill, Governm, ental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie,
27 U. Cm. L. REV. 463 (1960).
72. Currie, Quiescent Years, supra note 69, at 295 [627] (emphasis added). For a discus-
sion of the judicial method in conflicts cases, see Sedler, Judicial Method, supra note 11, at
82-87.
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As the above discussion makes clear, Currie's use of the term "method of
statutory construction" was in the context of identifying the policies con-
tained in a statute, in the same manner as identifying the policies con-
tained in a common-law rule in order to determine the applicability of
both statutes and common-law rules to "mixed cases." It is simply aston-
ishing to me how Professor Brilmayer could rely on the above passage for
the proposition that "[p]roponents of 'governmental interest analysis'
have marketed their theory as a species of legislative interpretation, in-
deed as the definitive approach to construing legislative intent""3 or could
conclude, based on that passage, that interest analysis is based on the
premise that "a rational legislature would, upon reflection, prefer the re-
sults of interest analysis to those of competing methodologies."'" Currie
said nothing about trying to determine whether the legislature demon-
strably or constructively intended for the statute to apply to a particular
case containing a foreign element and certainly said nothing about legisla-
tive preference for a particular approach to choice of law. He was explain-
ing how courts should decide conflicts cases, and as the above passage
makes clear, interest analysis is equally applicable to policies reflected in
common-law rules.
Now let us consider the statement: "It is explicitly an attempt to de-
termine legislative purposes." Here, Currie was comparing the govern-
mental interest approach with the 'grouping of contacts' approach.7' Let
us put the statement in context:
Governmental-interest analysis determines the relevance of the relation-
ship by inquiring whether it furnishes a reasonable basis for the state's
assertion of an interest in applying the policy embodied in its law. Its
methodology-while no one would claim for it ease of application, 77 or
complete objectivity, or more precision than we ordinarily find in legal
reasoning-is at least the familiar one of construction and interpretation.
That methodology permits, and requires, a statement of the reasons why
a state's relationship to the case is thought to be significant. The state-
ment is sufficiently objective to be susceptible of objective criticism. It is
explicitly an attempt to determine legislative purpose, and if that pur-
pose is misinterpreted, legislative correction is invited. The process of
"grouping contacts" has none of these features. It deals in broad general-
73. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 392.
74. Id. at 393.
75. Id. at 392 n.1 (quoting Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion, supra note 69, at 40
[727]).
76. This is the approach originally adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws without the policy content of § 6.
77. I would submit that in light of the experience with the interest analysis approach in
the years since Currie wrote, it can indeed be claimed that the method provides 'ease of
application.'
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ities about the "interest" of a state in applying its law without inquiry
into how the "contacts" in question relate to the policies expressed in
specific laws.78
Interest analysis is indeed an "attempt to determine legislative purpose"
in the sense that legislative purpose refers to the policies embodied in a
statute or, to put it another way, to the objective that the legislature was
trying to accomplish by the enactment of the statute.7 9 Interest analysis
operates exactly the same way when a common-law rule is involved, but it
has nothing whatsoever to do with "legislative intent."
Professor Brilmayer simply has got it all wrong. She has launched a
sweeping attack on interest analysis as a basic approach to choice of law
based on a complete-one might almost say deliberate-misconception of
what interest analysis is all about. Interest analysis is in no sense based
on legislative intent, either actual or constructive. Under interest analy-
sis, the court makes the choice of law decision with reference to the poli-
cies embodied in the laws of the involved states and the interest of each
state, in light of those policies, in having its law applied on the point in
issue in the particular case. When the policy behind a rule of substantive
law would be advanced by its application in the particular case, that state
is deemed 'interested' in having the rule applied, and the court is not
concerned, if the rule is embodied in a statute, with whether the legisla-
ture 'intended' that the statute apply in the particular case.80
Legislative intent is relevant in the choice of law context only when the
legislature has manifested its intent for the applicability of a law it has
enacted to a situation containing a foreign element. As I have discussed
more fully elsewhere,8 the legislature may have imposed directives on the
applicability of a statute to a situation containing a foreign element, and,
if so, the courts of the enacting state are bound by those directives.
Thus, if the forum's legislature has directed, either expressly or as a mat-
ter of demonstrable intention, 2 that the statute shall be applied to a par-
78. Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion, supra note 69, at 39-40 [727-28] (emphasis
added).
79. See the discussion in Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5, at 194-
201.
80. The court is not concerned with determining legislative intent precisely because, as
Professor Brilmayer says: "In the vast majority of cases, legislatures have no actual intent
on territorial reach," or more precisely, on the application of a statute to a particular situa-
tion containing a foreign element. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 393 (emphasis in original).
When there is such an intent, it will be manifested in a statutory directive on the statute's
applicability in those situations. See generally, R. SEDLER & R. CRAMTON, supra note 3, at §
3.2000.
81. See generally Sedler, Functionally Restrictive Substantive Rules in American Con-
flicts Law, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 27 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Restrictive].
82. For discussion of determination of demonstrable legislative intention, see id. at 51.
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ticular situation containing a foreign element, the forum must apply the
statute to that situation, totally apart from choice of law considerations.8 8
Conversely, when the statute, by its own terms or as a matter of demon-
strable legislative intention, is inapplicable to a situation containing a for-
eign element, the forum court cannot apply the statute, again totally
apart from choice of law considerations."' In most cases, however, the leg-
islature will not have expressed itself one way or another, and the forum
court must determine the applicability of its statute to a situation con-
taining a foreign element in the same manner as it determines the appli-
cability of its own common-law rules. Under interest analysis, the deci-
sion on the applicability of a statute, like the decision on the applicability
of a common-law rule, is made with reference to the policy embodied in
the statute and the interest of the state, in light of that policy, in apply-
ing the statute to the particular situation containing a foreign element.
As the above discussion makes clear, interest analysis is not premised
on 'fidelity to legislative intent' and in fact has nothing to do with legisla-
tive intent. The interest analysts, contrary to Professor Brilmayer's asser-
tions, have not made "extravagant claims about fulfilling legislators'
wishes."8' 5 They have not made any claims about fulfilling legislators'
wishes at all. Their claim is that choice of law decisions should be made
with reference to the policies embodied in rules of substantive law,
whether statutes or common-law rules, and the interests of the involved
states in having their laws applied to implement those policies in the par-
ticular case.
The soundness of interest analysis as a basic approach to choice of law
cannot be challenged by contending that it proceeds on a premise on
which in fact it does not proceed. Thus, Professor Brilmayer's 'fundamen-
tal criticism' is completely irrelevant.
Professor Brilmayer also makes some specific criticisms of interest
analysis as a basic approach to choice of law, to which I also want to
respond. These are that interest analysis is "unpredictable" and that do-
mestic interpretation and conflicts interpretation are different enterprises
altogether."6
Professor Brilmayer says that interest analysis allows unpredictable re-
83. This statement assumes, of course, that such application would be constitutional. A
good example of a statutory directive for the application of the forum's statute is U.C.C. §
1-105 (1972), in which the forum is directed to apply its version of the Uniform Commercial
Code to all transactions "bearing an appropriate relation" to the forum.
84. See the discussion in Sedler, Restrictive, supra note 81, at 44-60.
85. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 431.
86. Id. at 393. Professor Brilmayer also charges that interest analysis is based on "paro-
chialism," id. at 393, a criticism that I will deal with in responding to Dean Ely's criticism in
the same vein. See infra text accompanying notes 164-193.
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suits in that persons who act in reliance on one state's laws "may be un-
fairly surprised by application of another's. 8 7 She says that one cause of
this unpredictability is the assumption that when a law embodies both a
regulatory policy and a compensatory policy, either would suffice to jus-
tify application of forum law. The forum would have an interest in apply-
ing its law to implement the compensatory policy whenever a forum resi-
dent was injured, but the defendant may not have known that a forum
resident could be injured at the time the defendant acted. But, she says,
in enacting a statute that embodies a regulatory policy, a legislature
"manifests a belief that most people will change their behavior in con-
templation of the law."88 She concludes: "It seems unjust to apply such
a law to persons who could have had no notice of the applicable stan-
dards, since the legislature could not have expected them to change their
conduct to conform."
' 9
So far, everything that Professor Brilmayer has said is unexceptional.
As I have emphasized many times, fairness to the parties is an indepen-
dent choice of law consideration."0 A state will not-and constitutionally
cannot-apply its own law in any situation in which to do so would be
fundamentally unfair to the party against whom the law is sought to be
applied.91 If a party could not reasonably be expected to conform its con-
duct to the standards imposed by the law of a particular state, then it
would be fundamentally unfair to apply those standards to that party
despite the forum's interest in doing so. Predictability relates to funda-
mental fairness, however, only in the sense that it means, foreseeability.
The application of a state's law to govern the conduct of a party must
have been foreseeable to a party at the time the party acted. If interest
analysis allowed unpredictable results in the sense that it allowed the ap-
plication of a state's law to a party who could not have foreseen such
application at the time the party acted, those results would not only be
unsound, they would be unconstitutional. No reported case can be found,
however, in which a court following interest analysis, or any other ap-
proach, has allowed such a result, and Professor Brilmayer cites none.
Like many of the other critics, she postulates hypothetical cases that have
87. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 402.
88. Id. at 403.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., the discussion in Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra'note 5, at
222: "It should be noted, of course, that in any choice of law case, considerations of fair-
ness to the parties is an independent value. A court will not make a choice of law decision
that would be fundamentally unfair to either or both parties."
91. For a discussion of the constitutional stricture of "fundamental fairness," see Sedler,
Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of Constitutional General-
ism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 59, 89-92 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Constitutional
Limitations].
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never arisen and says that they could be decided under interest analysis
in a way that would produce an unpredictable result. But even here, she
misapplies interest analysis.
She begins with a dramshop act example. She notes correctly that
dramshop acts embody both a compensatory and a regulatory policy and
says that "[i]f either of the two policies is a sufficient basis for applying a
dramshop act, then civil liability is appropriate whenever the sale occurs
within the state or a state resident is injured."9 She then goes
on: "Interest analysis would thus seem to imply that if while on vaca-
tion in a state with no dramshop act, a forum resident is hit by an auto
careening out of a local bar's parking lot, then he may return home, sue,
and recover from the tavern owner. '93 There is one rather fundamental
problem with this example: it could not, as stated, arise in the real
world. Assuming that the local bar was doing business only in that state
and was not located in proximity to the victim's home state, there would
be no way that such a case could be brought constitutionally in the vic-
tim's home state.14 Thus, this example of an allegedly unpredictable re-
sult produced by interest analysis simply could not happen.
For the sake of argument, however, I will change the facts to posit an
example that could arise in the real world and that would raise that issue
of unpredictable result. A resident of Minnesota, which has a dramshop
act, is vacationing in Nevada, which does not. The accident occurs in the
parking lot of a national restaurant chain, which serves alcoholic bever-
ages. Since that chain has a number of establishments in Minnesota, it
can constitutionally be subject to suit there on the basis of forum-defen-
dant contacts. The Minnesota plaintiff brings suit in Minnesota to re-
cover under the Minnesota dramshop act. Professor Brilmayer says that
interest analysis would imply that the plaintiff could recover against the
restaurant.
She is clearly mistaken. Despite Minnesota's interest in applying its
dramshop act to implement the compensatory policy reflected in the law,
it will not do so here because the application of the Minnesota dramshop
act to the conduct of the restaurant in Nevada was not foreseeable at the
time that alcholic beverages were served to the intoxicated patron in Ne-
vada. It was not foreseeable because of the distance between Minnesota
and Nevada; the bartender in Nevada could not foresee that the serving
of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated patron in Nevada would cause
harm in Minnesota, and in fact it did not cause harm in Minnesota. ' The
92. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 403 (emphasis in original).
93. Id.
94. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
95. Cf. Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070
(1980), in which the Wisconsin tavern was located in a city on the Wisconsin-Minnesota
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foreseeable ambit of harm was limited to Nevada, and under Nevada law
no liability was imposed. Thus, while Minnesota has an interest in apply-
ing its law in this case in order to implement the compensatory policy
reflected in that law, based on the victim's Minnesota residence, the Min-
nesota court will not-and constitutionally cannot 9 -apply its law on
that basis because in this case the application of Minnesota law was not
foreseeable to the Nevada actor at the time the act took place.
Professor Brilmayer says that "[i]nterest analysts . . . are not noted for
their fondness for foreseeability tests." 97 I do not really understand what
she means by this point, and it is difficult to see its relevance. Fairness is
an independent choice of law consideration, and the forum does not apply
its own law, despite a real interest in doing so, when the application of its
law would be fundamentally unfair to the party against whom it is sought
to be invoked. In the tort context, the application of a state's law to im-
pose liability against a defendant is fundamentally unfair only if the ap-
plication of that law could not have been foreseen by the defendant at the
time the act took place. As I have stated elsewhere:
On the other hand, foreseeability does come into play most prominently
in tort cases in the sense that subjecting a party to a particular kind of
liability in particular circumstances must have been reasonably foresee-
able so that the party could be expected to insure against such liability
or to bear the consequences of the failure to do so."
In our example, the restaurant that served alcoholic beverages to an in-
toxicated patron was located in a state that did not have a dramshop act.
Subjecting the restaurant to dramshop liability simply because the victim
was a resident of a state that had a dramshop act was not foreseeable to
the restaurant, and the national chain could not reasonably be expected
to insure against dramshop liability for the actions of this restaurant.
border close to an interstate exit. In addition, taverns in Wisconsin could stay open six
hours later than taverns in Minnesota. In these circumstances, it was likely that a number
of the tavern's late night customers would be Minnesotans. It was thus foreseeable that the
service of liquor to an intoxicated patron at this tavern could cause an accident in Minne-
sota. On this basis, the Minnesota court held that the tavern constitutionally could be sub-
ject to long-arm jurisdiction in Minnesota and applied Minnesota law allowing recovery. See
also Young v. Gilbert, 121 N.J. Super. 78, 296 A.2d 87 (1972), in which a tavern was located
in New York seven miles from the New Jersey state line and New Jersey youths between
eighteen and twenty-one could purchase alcoholic beverages in New York, but not in New
Jersey. Under these facts, the tavern could be constitutionally subject to suit in New Jersey
for injuries caused by a New Jersey resident who had become intoxicated at the tavern.
96. The lack of foreseeability would render it fundamentally unfair for Minnesota to
apply its law here, and such fundamental unfairness would be violative of the due process
clause.
97. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 404.
98. R. SEDLER & R. CRAMTON, supra note 3, § 9.0000 (emphasis in original).
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Therefore, under interest analysis-or any other approach to choice of
law-dramshop liability under Minnesota law would not and constitu-
tionally could not be imposed in this case.
We may compare our example case with Bernhard v. Harrah's Club.99
In Bernhard, the application of the California dramshop act to the con-
duct of this Nevada tavernkeeper was fully foreseeable because of the
proximity of the tavern to the California state line and its regular and
frequent patronage by Californians. While the tavern extensively adver-
tised in California, the result should have been no different if the tavern
had not advertised, given its proximity to the California state line and its
regular and frequent patronage by Californians.100 Because of the prox-
imity and the regular and frequent patronage, the tavern could foresee
that if it served alcohol to an intoxicated patron, the patron could cause
an accident in California as well as in Nevada. Therefore, the imposition
of liability under the California dramshop act against this Nevada
tavernkeeper did not produce an unpredictable result.101
It is difficult to see what Professor Brilmayer means when she says that
interest analysis allows unpredictable results in that persons who act in
reliance on one state's laws "may be unfairly surprised by the application
of another's.'10 2 In the example she has given in support of this conten-
tion, after it was altered so that it could arise in the real world, liability
would not be imposed precisely because the imposition of such liability
was not foreseeable at the time the actor acted. She completely ignores
the fact that fairness is an independent choice of law consideration and
that under interest analysis, the forum will not apply its own law, despite
a real interest in doing so, when the application of its law would be fun-
damentally unfair to the party against whom it is sought to be invoked.
In the cases that arise in practice, fundamental unfairness has not been a
problem. Either the defendant did not act in reliance on one state's
laws'0 3 or the application of the law of the forum imposing liability was
fully foreseeable to the defendant at the time he acted.'0 4 In this regard,
99. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
100. See Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978); Young v. Gilbert, 121 N.J.
Super. 78, 296 A.2d 87 (1972).
101. Professor Brilmayer uses Bernhard as the starting point for her hypothetical case
but does not indicate any disagreement with the result in Bernhard itself. See Brilmayer,
supra note 18, at 406.
102. Id. at 402.
103. An example of this would arise when a plaintiff from a recovery state is injured by a
nonrecovery-state defendant in a nonrecovery state and the plaintiff's home state, where the
defendant is subject to jurisdiction on the basis of forum-defendant contacts, applies its own
comparative negligence law to allow recovery. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Consolidated Freight-
ways, 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974).
104. This was the situation in Bernhard and in Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884
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then, Professor Brilmayer clearly has not demonstrated that interest
analysis allows unpredictable results.
Professor Brilmayer then says that interest analysis can produce unpre-
dictable results in that, if there is no way of determining in advance
whether particular conduct will be covered by a statute, residents and
nonresidents alike are put to a difficult choice between foregoing conduct
that may later turn out to have been permissible and risking sanctions.
She notes that this is the typical vagueness problem and says that if peo-
ple are unaware of the penalties because the possibility of applying the
statute seems too remote, then such application surprises individuals af-
ter the fact.105 I would not dispute these points, but I fail to see what they
have to do with the question of whether interest analysis can produce
unpredictable results. Perhaps she is making these points in connection
with the alleged difficulty in determining policies and interests, an argu-
ment to which I have responded elsewhere.'" In any event, the matter of
determining in advance whether particular conduct will be covered by a
statute-the vagueness problem-is something quite different from the
matter of determining whether a state's law will be applied to a situation
that contains a foreign element under interest analysis.
To support her contention here, Professor Brilmayer has posited an ex-
ample of a state law that requires manufacturers of lawnmowers to install
a special safety guard and provides that noncompliance shall be negli-
gence per se. A resident manufacturer diligently complies with the statute
when manufacturing lawnmowers to be sold within the state, but, in order
to avoid being put at a competitive disadvantage, does not install the
safety shield on mowers manufactured for use in other states. She asks if
the forum would apply the statute if the person injured in an out-of-state
accident turns out to be a resident and says that it is unlikely that an
interest analysis scholar or court would go that far. But, she asks, "if not,
why not?"10
I submit that the statute should be applied to impose liability on the
resident manufacturer whether the victim is a resident or a nonresident.
The policy embodied in this statute is purely a regulatory one, and the
forum's interest in applying its law to implement that policy is predicated
on the fact that the conduct the law sought to regulate-the manufacture
of the lawnmower-occurred in the forum. 10 8 Since the lawnmower was
(Minn. 1978).
105. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 407.
106. See Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5.
107. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 404.
108. For a discussion of a state's interest in applying its law in order to implement regu-
latory and admonitory policies, see Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach supra note 5,
at 202.
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manufactured in the forum, it is irrelevant, as far as the forum's interest
in applying its law to implement the policy reflected in that law is con-
cerned, whether the accident occurred in the forum or elsewhere or
whether the victim was a resident or a nonresident. It is also irrelevant,
for the same reason, that the particular lawnmower was manufactured for
use in another state. The legislature in enacting the law was concerned
about regulating the manufacture of lawnmowers and did not distinguish
between lawnmowers manufactured for use in the state and lawnmowers
manufactured for use elsewhere. Perhaps it was just as concerned about
the safety of nonresidents as it was about the safety of residents."0 9 Per-
haps it did not make an exception for lawnmowers manufactured for use
elsewhere because it thought that there was the danger that such a lawn-
mower might be sold mistakenly in the local market. We cannot speculate
about the motivation of the legislature in enacting the law. It enacted a
law requiring that the shield be placed on all lawnmowers manufactured
in the state, and its purpose in adopting the negligence per se rule was to
deter manufacturers from trying to get away with manufacturing
lawnmowers without the shield.110 Since the lawnmower in question was
manufactured in the state, the policy to be implemented by the law will
be advanced by its application in this case even though the accident in-
volving the mower occurred in another state. For this reason also, the
application of the negligence per se rule to the manufacturer in this case
was fully predictable at the time of manufacture.
Professor Brilmayer says that "[slurely all concerned are better off if
there is a predictable basis for deciding which lawnmowers need
shields." '' Here, there is indeed a "predictable basis for deciding which
lawnmowers need shields.""' It is all lawnmowers manufactured in the
forum, because the law by its terms is directed toward the manufacture of
lawnmowers and makes no exception for lawnmowers manufactured in
the forum for intended sale elsewhere.
The absence of unpredictability here is even more clear if we posit a
'vagueness' challenge to the law, which we will assume also imposes crimi-
nal penalties. Suppose the manufacturer defended the criminal charge on
the ground that the particular lawnmower was intended for export, and to
quote Professor Brilmayer, the manufacturer made the reasonable infer-
ence that "my state legislature would have no desire to regulate my sales
109. In this sense, it was being 'evenhanded.'
110. Critics of interest analysis tend to be confused about the difference between legisla-
tive purpose and legislative motivation. See the discussion in Sedler, Governmental Inter-
est Approach, supra note 5, at 197-98.
111. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 407.
112. Id.
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in other jurisdictions."' The vagueness challenge is absurd because the
terms of the statute are clear. The statute refers to all lawnmowers and
makes no exception for lawnmowers intended for export to another state.
The court theoretically could graft such an exception onto the statute,
but it is not likely to do so. Most certainly, however, the manufacturer
cannot claim 'unfair surprise' because the court chooses not to accept the
exception that the manufacturer unilaterally read into the statute. If the
manufacturer had consulted a lawyer in advance, the lawyer most assur-
edly would have advised against unilaterally reading such an exception
into the statute.
Likewise, in the choice, of law context, the application of the statute
was fully foreseeable to the manufacturer at the time the lawnmower was
manufactured. It was fully foreseeable because the conduct the law
sought to regulate occurred in the forum. The application of the statute
to impose liability on the manufacturer when the particular lawnmower
was sold in another state without the required shield in no sense produces
an unpredictable result. Professor Brilmayer thus has failed completely
to substantiate her charge that interest analysis allows unpredictable
results.
We may now consider Professor Brilmayer's contention that "domestic
interpretation and conflicts interpretation are different enterprises alto-
gether."1 1 4 Professor Brilmayer makes this contention in the context of
challenging the "assumption" of interest analysis that "conflict-of-laws
reasoning is no different from ordinary substantive interpretation of stat-
utes."" 5 According to her, interest analysts say that in both cases "the
job is allegedly to determine whether the policies behind the statute make
the statutory remedy appropriate in the particular case." 1 I will come
back to the point of comparison shortly, but first I want to discuss Pro-
fessor Brilmayer's development of this contention.
Professor Brilmayer makes a number of theoretical points about the
differences between "domestic interpretation" and "conflicts interpreta-
tion." She talks about "conflicts preconditions" and "substantive precon-
ditions" for the application of a state's law in light of relevant and irrele-
vant connecting factors and relates these "preconditions" to the question
of whether the forum legislature intends its law to apply.1 7 I must con-
fess that I have some difficulty in seeing the relevancy of the points she is
making to the question of whether there is a similarity between the pro-
cess of determining policies and interests in the domestic context and the
113. Id. at 404.
114. Id. at 417.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 421.
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process of determining policies and interests in the conflicts context.
To the extent that interest analysts draw a comparison between "do-
mestic interpretation" and "conflicts interpretation," they do so to deter-
mine the policies behind a particular rule of substantive law and the in-
terest of a state, in light of those policies, in applying that rule to a
particular case containing a foreign element. There is indeed a similarity
between the process of determining the policy behind a rule of law for the
purpose of deciding on its application in a marginal domestic case-a case
in which the rule is not clearly applicable-and determining the policy
behind a rule of law for the purpose of deciding whether the state has a
real interest in applying its rule in a case containing a foreign element. As
I have put it:
Just as a court in a domestic case must decide whether a statute should
be applicable to a situation not clearly within its terms, in a conflicts case
a court must decide whether the application of a statute or common law
rule in the circumstances presented effectuates the legislative purpose. " s
To quote Professor Hancock: "Generally speaking, the court's basic task
in a choice-of-law case is analogous to that in a wholly domestic case; it
must decide whether or not an unforeseen set of facts comes within the
policy range of a statutory or non-statutory domestic rule." 9 We make
this comparison primarily to show that just as it is not difficult to deter-
mine policy and interest in the domestic context, it is not difficult to de-
termine policy and interest in the conflicts context either. 2 '
The similarity of the processes can be illustrated by the following ex-
amples of spousal immunity cases. In the purely domestic case, plaintiff
and defendant were not married to each other at the time of the accident
but married subsequently. The attorney for the insurance company, rep-
resenting the nominal defendant, asserts the defense of spousal immu-
nity. Here, the issue is whether the spousal immunity bar applies when
the parties were not married at the time of the accident but married sub-
sequently. In resolving that question, the court considers the policy be-
hind the rule of spousal immunity and whether that policy will be ad-
vanced by its application to this particular domestic situation. Since a
rule of spousal immunity can serve the policies of protecting marital har-
mony and conversely of preventing collusive suits against the insurer 2 '
118. Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5, at 201. With a common-law
rule, we would refer to the purpose of the court in adopting that rule.
119. Hancock, Tort Problems in Conflict of Laws Resolved by Statutory Construc-
tion: The Halley and Other Older Cases Revisited, 18 U. TORONTo L.J. 331, 340 (1968).
120. See the discussion in Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5, at
201-04.
121. Both of these policies are legitimate. In some cases application of the rule could
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and since those policies would be advanced by applying the rule to bar
suits by parties who are married at the time of the suit but were not
married at the time of the accident, the court is likely to hold that the
spousal immunity bar applies in this marginal domestic case.' 2 2
Now let us consider the question of spousal immunity in a conflicts
case. Married parties who reside in State X, which retains the spousal
immunity rule, are involved in an accident in State Y, which does not
recognize spousal immunity. The injured party brings suit against the
other spouse in State X.121 Under interest analysis, the State X court
must determine whether State X has a real interest in applying its rule of
spousal immunity in this case with a foreign element. The court deter-
mines the policies behind the rule of spousal immunity just as it did in
the marginal domestic case. Since any marital disharmony will be felt in
State X and since the accident will be charged to the insurer's State X
loss experience, the policies reflected in the rule of spousal immunity will
be advanced by the rule's application in this case just as they would in a
purely domestic case. The fact that the accident occurred in State Y is
irrelevant, as far as the policy reflected in State Y's substantive rule is
concerned, just as the fact that the parties were not married at the time
of the accident was irrelevant, as far as the policy reflected in the rule of
spousal immunity is concerned, in the purely domestic case.
In other words, by looking to the policies embodied in the rule of
spousal immunity, a court determines both whether the rule should be
applied in the marginal domestic case when the parties were not married
to each other at the time of the accident and in the conflicts case when
the accident occurred in another state. The process is exactly the same in
both situations. In this sense, at least, domestic interpretation and con-
flicts interpretation are not 'different enterprises altogether.'
Even if Professor Brilmayer is correct in her contention that there are
theoretical differences between domestic interpretation and conflicts in-
terpretation, this contention is in no way relevant to the point of compar-
advance the policy of protecting marital harmony, such as when one spouse sues the other
to recover for an intentional tort, while in other cases, it could advance the policy of
preventing collusive suits against the insurer, such as in the typical accident. As Currie ob-
served: "The business of courts in conflict-of-laws cases is not to judge the policies of the
states, but to ascertain them and give them effect, so far as possible, when there is a legiti-
mate basis for effectuating them." Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Auto-
mation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 220 [128, 144] (1958).
122. Cf. Kjeldsen v. Ballard, 52 Misc. 2d 952, 277 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
123. This is not likely to happen today, because the plaintiff, knowing that State X is
likely to apply its law to deny recovery, will bring suit in State Y, hoping that State Y will
apply its own law. When suit has been brought in the home state on the mistaken assump-
tion that the court would look to the law of the state of injury, that state has applied its own
law to deny recovery. See, e.g., McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966).
1983]
MERCER LAW REVIEW
ison between domestic interpretation and conflicts interpretation under
the interest analysis methodology. As I have demonstrated, the process
of determining policies and interests is exactly the same in both
situations.
Professor Brilmayer's specific criticisms of the interest analysis ap-
proach, as well as her broad-based "constructive legislative intent" criti-
cism, completely misapprehend how interest analysis works. She has la-
bored to find weakness in the theory, but has paid scant attention to how
interest analysis operates in practice. Most assuredly, she has not sup-
ported her contention by concrete examples showing that the interest
analysis approach in fact produces functionally unsound or unfair results.
It is thus difficult to take her criticisms very seriously.
C. Ely: Improper Preference for One's Own
Dean Ely, a leading constitutional scholar, has launched a constitution-
ally-based attack"" on what he calls the state's interest in protecting its
own." 5 He says that Currie's "basic methodological premise "128 is that
states are interested in protecting their own and that without this basic
methodological premise, "interest analysis is largely impotent."' 27 As a
part of the state's interest in protecting its own, he goes on to say that
"states are interested in applying their rules so as to generate victories for
their own people in a way that they are not interested in generating victo-
ries for others."' 2 8 Dean Ely then seeks to demonstrate that the premise
that states have a greater interest in advancing the interests of their own
residents than they have in advancing the interests of outsiders is consti-
tutionally doubtful 29 and that if the premise is unconstitutional, then
"the dominant contemporary choice-of-law theory is unconstitutional.' 30
I will come back to the constitutional question later, but it is not the
major part of my response to Dean Ely's criticism.
My primary response to Dean Ely's criticism is that he completely mis-
understands the basic premise of interest analysis and the reasons that, in
certain circumstances, a state's real interest in applying a rule of substan-
tive law in order to implement the policies reflected in that law is limited
to residents and does not extend to nonresidents. The basic premise of
interest analysis most assuredly is not that "states are interested in pro-
tecting their own residents in a way they are not interested in protecting
124. Ely, supra note 19.
125. Id. at 173.
126. Id. at 175.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 178.
129. Id. at 179.
130. Id. at 186-87.
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others" ' or that "states are interested in applying their rules so as to
generate victories for their own people in a way that they are not inter-
ested in generating victories for others. 1 3' The basic premise of interest
analysis is that choice of law decisions should be made with reference to a
state's interest in applying a rule of substantive law in order to imple-
ment the policy reflected in that law. This basic premise is completely
unaffected by the matter of whether the party who will benefit from the
application of a state's law is a resident or a nonresident. If it is a nonres-
ident who will benefit from the application of a state's law in circum-
stances in which the state has a real interest in applying its law in order
to implement the policy reflected in that law, the state's interest in hav-
ing its law applied is no less than it would be if the party who would
benefit is a resident. The focal point of interest analysis is a state's inter-
est in applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected in that
law, and the party who would benefit from the application of a state's
law-whether a resident or a nonresident-is deemed entitled to invoke
such benefit in the choice of law context.
In support of his contention that 'interest analysts' say that "states are
unusually interested in promoting the fortunes of their own people,"'1 3
Dean Ely quotes as typical one of my statements: "The plaintiff's home
state is interested in applying its own law allowing its resident to recover,
while the defendant's home state is equally interested in applying its own
law to protect the defendant and the insurer. 134  That statement was
made in the context of analyzing a true conflict in which a plaintiff from a
recovery state is injured by a defendant from a nonrecovery state in the
defendant's home state.1 3 5 In the typical accident case, the relevant inter-
ests are compensatory and protective ones, and a state's interest in apply-
ing its law in order to implement those policies indeed depends on a
party's residence in that state, since the consequences of the accident
and of imposing or denying liability will be felt by the parties and the
insurer in the parties' home state.
In the situation to which I was referring, the plaintiff's home state has
a real interest in applying its law that allows the plaintiff to recover since
the social and economic consequences of the accident will be felt by the
plaintiff in that state. Conversely, the defendant's home state has a real
131. Id. at 175.
132. Id. at 178.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Sedler, Rules, supra note 4, at 1036).
135. The interests would be the same if the accident occurred in the plaintiff's home
state. No reported case has contained the latter situation, perhaps because there can be no
doubt that in this situation the plaintiff's home state would apply its own law to allow
recovery.
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interest in applying its law that denies recovery since the consequences of
imposing liability will be felt by the defendant in that state and if the
defendant is insured against liability, this accident will be charged to the
insurer's loss experience in that state. The application of the law of each
party's home state for the benefit of that party in this situation is not
justified on the ground that "states are unusually interested in promoting
the fortunes of their own people."' 3 6 It is justified on the ground that in
this particular fact-law pattern,"3 7 it is the fact of residency that gives rise
to an interest in applying a state's law on the issue of tort liability, and
for that reason, each state is interested in applying its law for the benefit
of its resident party.
In a different fact-law pattern, implementation of the policy reflected
in a state's rule of substantive law, under interest analysis, would require
application of its law to enable a nonresident party to prevail over a resi-
dent party. As stated above, when a law reflects a compensatory or pro-
tective policy,' a state's interest in applying its law to implement that
policy is usually predicated on a party's residence in that state since it is
there that the consequences toward which the compensatory or protective
policy is directed are likely to be felt. When a law, however, reflects a
regulatory or admonitory policy, as has been discussed previously, a
state's interest in applying its law to implement that policy is predicated
on the connection between that state and the conduct sought to be regu-
lated or prevented, totally apart from the residence of the actor or the
victim. Dean Ely notes that states do have interests that "are indifferent
to the residence of either or both parties to a lawsuit," but says that 'in-
terest analysts' generally ignore such interests.'3 ' Here, Dean Ely is quite
wrong. A state's interest in applying its law in order to implement a reg-
ulatory or admonitory policy reflected in that law is as much a part of
136. Ely, supra note 19, at 178.
137. As to the meaning of fact-law patterns, see Sedler, Rules, supra note 4, at 980-81.
138. Professor Brilmayer argues that laws reflecting compensatory and protective poli-
cies also have a regulatory effect in the sense that the legislature was aware that those laws
would alter conduct. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 405. For purposes of determining a state's
interest in applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, however,
we refer to a policy designed to regulate behavior or to deter conduct, totally apart
from-rather than incidental to-any compensatory or protective policy reflected in that
law. So, while Oregon's spendthrift immunity law involved in Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or.
1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964), might have the incidental effect of influencing the conduct of con-
tracting parties in Oregon, this was not the purpose behind the enactment of that law and
the law reflects a protective, not a regulatory, policy. Oregon would have no interest, there-
fore, in applying its spendthrift immunity law to immunize a California spendthrift, whose
contracts were not voidable under California law, from liability to an Oregon plaintiff on the
ground that the contract between the parties was centered in Oregon. See the discussion of
this situation in Sedler, Characterization, supra note 50, at 82-83.
139. Ely, supra note 19, at 194.
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interest analysis as a state's interest in applying its law in order to imple-
ment a compensatory or protective policy reflected in that law. The appli-
cation of a state's law to implement a regulatory or admonitory policy will
sometimes have the effect of enabling a nonresident to prevail over a resi-
dent, and when it does have this effect, it completely belies the conten-
tion that "states are unusually interested in promoting the fortunes of
their own people.
140
Perhaps the best example of this situation is the oft-discussed case of
Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc.'41 There, a New York
broker filed suit in New York against a New Jersey corporation to recover
a finder's fee based on an alleged oral agreement. The transaction had
significant factual connections with both states. The oral agreement was
unenforceable under the New York statute of frauds but was valid under
New Jersey law. Because of the significant factual connections that the
transaction had with New York, New York had a real interest in applying
its statute of frauds in order to implement the transaction-regulating pol-
icy reflected in that law."2 It did so and thus denied recovery to the New
York plaintiff against the New Jersey defendant. It likewise would seem
that New Jersey, on the basis of the significant factual connections that
the transaction had with New Jersey, would also have a real interest in
applying its law allowing recovery in this case and therefore, under inter-
est analysis, should hold for the. New York plaintiff against the New
Jersey defendant. 43 In this case, then, both states would have a real in-
terest in applying their law, and the effect of the application of each
state's law would be to favor the nonresident party over the resident
party.
Most of the cases involving regulatory and admonitory policies arise in
the tort area, and usually, in terms of interest analysis, they present a
false conflict. The state where the prescribed conduct occurred has a real
interest in applying its law in order to implement the regulatory or ad-
monitory policy reflected in that law, and the other involved state ordina-
140. Id. at 178.
141. 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969).
142. For a discussion of the transaction-regulating policy reflected in the New York stat-
ute of frauds, see Sedler, Critique, supra note 4, at 827-31.
143. The New York court said that New Jersey had no interest in applying its law to
allow recovery by a New York broker against a New Jersey principal and thus treated the
case as a false conflict. 24 N.Y.2d at 385, 248 N.E.2d at 584, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 828. I took the
same position at an earlier time and now realize that this was erroneous. As I have pointed
out elsewhere, under Currie's interest analysis there is no reason to distinguish between the
false conflict in which the forum is the only interested state and the true conflict in which
the forum is one of the interested states, since in both situations Currie advocates applica-
tion of the forum's own law. Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5, at 220-
22.
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rily has no interest in applying its law to shield the actor from liability. 44
When the victim is a nonresident and the actor is a resident, the effect of
the application of the law of the state where the conduct occurred is to
enable a nonresident to prevail over a resident. Some examples of this
situation that have arisen in practice are illustrated in the following cases.
In Gaither v. Myers,"' a car was stolen in the District of Columbia. The
thief injured the victim in Maryland. The owner of the car, a District of
Columbia resident, had left his keys in the car. The District of Colum-
bia's law, which imposed strict liability for any harm caused by leaving
keys in a car, was applied here. In Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc.,'"
the court used Iowa law to impose strict liability when a grenade, defec-
tively manufactured in Iowa, led to an explosion at an Army base in
Georgia and injured a Washington victim. Illinois law was used to impose
liability in Gravina v. Brunswick Corp. 47 for invasion of privacy. This
arose from the unauthorized use of the name and photograph in Illinois
of a Rhode Island resident.1 48 In Rutherford v. Gray Line, Inc.,"' New
York law imposing vicarious liability on the owner of a vehicle was held
to embody a regulatory policy. It therefore applied to impose liability on
a New York owner of a vehicle for the wrongful death of a Pennsylvania
resident in New York. 50
As the cases make abundantly clear, interest analysis has nothing to do
with enabling a resident party to prevail over a nonresident party. Inter-
est analysis is premised on a state's interest in applying its law in order to
implement the policy reflected in that law, and in some circumstances,
the application of a state's law on this basis will enable a nonresident to
prevail over a resident.
144. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Rules, supra note 4, at 1038.
145. 404 F.2d 216, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
146. 502 F.2d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 1974).
147. 338 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.R.I. 1972).
148. Recovery did not appear to be authorized under Rhode Island law. The federal
court, sitting as a Rhode Island state court, treated the case as a false conflict, with Illinois
being the only interested state, and applied Illinois law. The Illinois court would have
reached the same result if suit had been brought there.
149. 615 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir. 1980).
150. See also Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 583, 555 P.2d 997, 1002
(1976), in which the Washington court rather questionably saw its policy of allowing unlim-
ited recovery in wrongful death actions as reflecting an admonitory policy and applied
Washington law to impose unlimited liability against a Washington defendant when the
negligent conduct in Washington resulted in the death of a Kansas resident in Kansas.
Kansas law limited liability for wrongful death. The court thus characterized the case as a
false conflict rather than as the unprovided-for case. If it had characterized the case as
presenting the unprovided-for case, however, it is likely that Washington law allowing un-
limited recovery likely would have been applied. See the discussion and review of cases in
Sedler, Rules, supra note 4, at 1038-39.
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Putting aside this completely inaccurate view of the basic premises of
interest analysis, let us now consider what may be called Dean Ely's more
restrained criticism of a "state's interest in protecting its own. ' "" He ob-
jects to the proposition that a state's compensatory and protective poli-
cies extend only to its residents and suggests that such preference for
residents may be violative of the privileges and immunities clause.'52
Professor Brilmayer makes the same criticism under the heading of "pa-
rochialism. '1 5 3 She uses the example of a forum that has a guest statute.
In a negligence action brought by a resident passenger against a nonresi-
dent driver, who presumably is from a state that does not have a guest
statute, 54 the defendant cannot claim the benefit of the forum's guest
statute. If the nonresident, however, had been the passenger and the resi-
dent had been the driver, the forum would have an "interest" 5 5 in apply-
ing its guest statute. She concludes that under interest analysis, "the out-
of-stater must pay if he is the driver but cannot collect if he is the
passenger."'"
Let me first respond to the charge of parochialism levelled by Professor
Brilmayer since, as we will see, the response also will be relevant to
counter Dean Ely's constitutional argument. When the defendant is from
a guest statute state and the plaintiff is from a recovery state, a true con-
flict is presented irrespective of where the accident occurred. In Professor
Brilmayer's example, since suit was brought in the defendant's home
state 57 and since that state has a real interest in applying its law in order
to protect its defendants and their insurance companies, it will apply its
own law to implement that protective policy. 58 In terms of interest anal-
ysis, when a defendant from a recovery state injures a plaintiff from a
151. Ely, supra note 19, at 173.
152. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; Ely, supra note 19, at 181.
153. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 408.
154. If the driver were from a state that had a guest statute, there would be no conflict
of laws on the issue of guest-host immunity.
155. The quotation of "interest" is from Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 408.
156. Id.
157. In such a case, of course, the plaintiff will try to bring the suit in the plaintiff's
home state, which would be possible if the transaction had some factual connections with
that state, see, e.g., Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972), or if the defendant were
an enterprise doing business in that state, see, e.g., Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways,
300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974).
158. There have been no cases involving this precise situation, probably because a plain-
tiff who cannot obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in the plaintiff's home state will not
bring suit. For cases involving other defenses, such as limitations on wrongful death liabil-
ity, see Sedler, Rules, supra note 4, at 1037-38. The rule of choice of law here is that when a
plaintiff from a recovery state is injured by a defendant from a nonrecovery state and suit is
brought in the defendant's home state, the defendant's home state will apply its own law
and deny recovery.
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guest statute state in the latter's home state, the unprovided-for case is
presented: the plaintiff's home state has a policy of protecting defen-
dants, and that policy will not be advanced by applying it in favor of out-
of-state defendants since the consequences of imposing liability on the
defendant and the insurer will not be felt in that state; conversely, the
defendant's home state has a policy of protecting plaintiffs, and since all
the consequences of the accident will be felt by the plaintiff in the home
state, that policy will not be advanced by applying it to allow recovery to
an out-of-state plaintiff injured in his home state. I have maintained that
in this situation recovery should be allowed on the ground that both
states have a common policy of allowing recovery, to which guest statute
immunity represents an exception, and since the only state interested in
allowing the exception does not do so, recovery should be allowed. 15 9 In
practice, the courts have generally allowed the plaintiff to recover in this
situation, 160 and we will assume that here the nonresident defendant will
be denied the benefit of the forum's guest statute.
Professor Brilmayer is critical of this result, and her criticism focusses
on the alleged lack of evenhandedness.' 6' She does not argue that recov-
ery should be allowed or denied in either case, but only that the defen-
dant should be treated the same way without regard to residence. Since
interest analysis dictates that the forum apply its guest statute in favor of
the resident defendant, the criticism of interest analysis here would have
to be on the ground that it does not mandate that the guest statute will
be applied in favor of the nonresident defendant as well.' The failure to
apply the guest statute in favor of the resident defendant, according to
Professor Brilmayer, is "blatant parochialism."'0' She claims that "[it
[blatant parochialism] jeopardizes a principle essential to the smooth
functioning of federal systems: treating nonresidents as fairly as
residents."'"
I will respond to the alleged lack of evenhandedness in the terms postu-
lated by Professor Brilmayer. Does denying the benefit of the forum's
guest statute to the nonresident defendant mean that the nonresident de-
fendant is not being treated as fairly as the resident defendant? Where, I
would ask, is the unfairness in refusing to give the nonresident defendant
159. Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5, at 233-36.
160. See the discussion and review of cases in Sedler, Rules, supra note 4, at 1038-39.
161. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 408.
162. While the interest analysis methodology can identify the unprovided-for case, it
cannot as such provide a means for its resolution, since by definition neither state has an
interest in applying its law on the point in issue. To apply the guest statute in favor of the
nonresident defendant, therefore, would not be inconsistent with interest analysis, but it is
not required by interest analysis either.
163. Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 410.
164. Id.
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the benefit of the forum's guest statute? This refusal is unfair only if we
assume that fair treatment means identical treatment. It is not unfair to
refuse to treat different defendants in an identical way if there is a rea-
sonable basis for the different treatment. Here the basis for the different
treatment of the resident defendant and the nonresident defendant is ob-
vious. In the case of the nonresident defendant, the policy reflected in the
guest statute will not be advanced; therefore, the forum has no interest in
applying its guest statute to implement that policy.
Professor Brilmayer's criticism of interest analysis for its alleged lack of
evenhandedness, at least in the context of this example, is somewhat cir-
cular. If interest analysis lacks evenhandedness in this example, it is only
because in one case the forum has a real interest in applying its law in
order to implement the policy reflected in that law and in the other case
it does not. Since the premise of interest analysis is that courts should
decide conflicts questions with reference to the policies and interests of
the involved states, interest analysis cannot be faulted for an alleged lack
of evenhandedness because it recognizes that in the case involving the
resident defendant the forum has a real interest in applying its law in
order to implement the policy reflected in that law and that in the case of
the nonresident defendant, it does not have such an interest. The nonres-
ident defendant is not being treated differently because of the fact of
nonresidency, but because the fact of nonresidency means that the forum
does not have a real interest in applying this particular rule of substan-
tive law in favor of this defendant. A nonresident defendant would be
treated unfairly in comparison to a resident defendant only if that defen-
dant came from a guest statute state and the forum refused to give that
defendant the benefit of guest statute immunity in a suit by a resident
plaintiff, but it would give its resident defendant the benefit of its guest
statute in a suit by a nonresident plaintiff. This, of course, would not
happen: if both the plaintiff and the defendant were from a guest stat-
ute state, there would be no conflict of laws on the issue of guest-host
immunity and the defense would be sustained.
In Professor Brilmayer's example, however, there is no lack of even-
handedness. There is a reasonable basis for the different treatment of res-
ident defendants and nonresident defendants, namely that when the de-
fendant is a resident, the forum has a real interest in applying its law in
order to implement the policy reflected in that law, but when the defen-
dant is a nonresident, it does not have such an interest. Unless it is some-
how illegitimate for a court to make conflicts decisions with reference to
the policies and interests of the involved states-which even Professor
Brilmayer has not contended-interest analysis cannot be faulted for an
alleged lack of evenhandedness.
We will use Professor Brilmayer's guest statute example to deal with
Dean Ely's constitutional objection to a "state's interest in protecting its
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own. ' ' "' Dean Ely says that the privileges and immunities clause1 60 pro-
hibits a state from discriminating against nonresidents and that different
treatment cannot be justified on the ground that the nonresident is lim-
ited to the protection provided by his home state. In support of this pro-
position, he relies primarily on Austin v. New Hampshire,'67 which invali-
dated a commuters' tax that applied to the New Hampshire-derived
income of nonresidents but exempted the income of residents similarly
earned within the state. Dean Ely says that it was irrelevant regarding
the privileges and immunities violation that the net effect of the law was
to tax an out-of-stater at the same rate imposed by the out-of-stater's
home state."" He then concludes that the principle of Austin v. New
Hampshire renders interest analysis unconstitutional insofar as it is
based on a state's interest in protecting its own. Here I will let Dean Ely
speak for himself:
Austin thus seems to stand rather directly for the proposition that it is
not sufficient under the Privileges and Immunities Clause to treat people
as the laws of their home states would treat them.
The importance of this conclusion should not be underestimated. If
Austin is right as written, the dominant contemporary choice-of-law the-
ory is unconstitutional. The threat is by no means simply to Brainerd
Currie's dictum that in cases of true conflict the forum should apply its
own law; the point is much more devastating. It undercuts the entire
methodology by indicating that whenever a state would claim an interest
in enforcing its protective policy on the ground that the party its law
would protect is a local resident-and that much is common to all "inter-
est" or "functional" analysts-it is obligated by the United States Con-
stitution to claim a similar interest in protecting out-of-staters, irrespec-
tive of what their home states' law provides. That, for reasons we have
canvassed, spells the end of "interest analysis" in any recognizable sense
of the term.'"
Under Dean Ely's argument, in the guest statute example, the guest stat-
ute state, which claims an interest in protecting resident defendants,
"would be obligated by the United States Constitution to claim a similar
interest in protecting out-of-staters."'I7
I think that Dean Ely's constitutional argument fails on two counts,
and they are somewhat interrelated. First, I think he has read the privi-
leges and immunities clause too broadly in regard to the matter of dis-
165. Ely, supra note 19, at 173.
166. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
167. 420 U.S. 656, 665 (1975).
168. Ely, supra note 19, at 186.
169. Id. at 186-87 (emphasis in original).
170. Id. at 187.
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crimination against nonresidents. Second-perhaps because he com-
pletely misapprehends the basic premises of interest analysis-he finds
discrimination against nonresidents in the choice of law context, when no
such discrimination in fact exists.
The privileges and immunities clause does indeed prohibit discrimina-
tion against nonresidents. It has never been interpreted, however, as
prohibiting all distinctions between residents and nonresidents. It pro-
hibits what may be called invidious discrimination against nonresidents,
that is, the different treatment of nonresidents simply because they are
nonresidents and without regard to any reasonable basis of distinction
between residents and nonresidents. The privileges and immunities
clause does not prohibit reasonable distinctions between residents and
nonresidents when the fact of residency or nonresidency is relevant to the
matter in issue. For example, it cannot seriously be contended that it is a
violation of the privileges and immunities clause for a state to require a
nonresident plaintiff to post security for costs in a court action although a
similar requirement is not imposed on resident plaintiffs.1 7 1
What a state may not do is to discriminate against nonresidents who
are similarly situated to residents with respect to the matter in issue.
Typical of such discrimination is the Alaska law invalidated in Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 1 2 which, to quote Dean Ely, "require[d] that local residents be
hired in preference to equally qualified nonresidents for all local employ-
ment resulting from oil or gas leases."'' 7
The discrimination invalidated by the court in Austin was blatant dis-
crimination against nonresidents who were similarly situated to residents
with respect to the matter in issue. Again to quote Dean Ely, the invali-
dated commuters' tax "applied to the New Hampshire-derived income of
nonresidents, but exempted the income of residents similarly earned
within the state. '17 4 This discrimination against nonresidents who were
similarly situated to residents with respect to the matter in issue, solely
because of their nonresidency, was not saved by the fact that the effect of
the law was to treat people as the laws of their home state would treat
them.1 7 5 What rendered the tax unconstitutional, then, was the discrimi-
nation between residents and nonresidents who were similarly situated
with respect to the matter in issue, and the otherwise unconstitutional
discrimination was not saved on the ground that it incorporated the tax
171. See, e.g., Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, 461 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1972); see also
Kreitzer v. Puerto Rico Cars, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 498 (D.P.R. 1975), afl'd, 535 F.2d 140
(1976).
172. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
173. Ely, supra note 19, at 182.
174. Id. at 186.
175. Id.
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rate of the nonresident's home state.
For constitutional purposes, then, the focus must be on whether the
nonresident is similarly situated to the resident with respect to the mat-
ter in issue. In our guest statute example, it is clear that the nonresident
defendant is not similarly situated to the resident defendant with respect
to the availability of the guest statute defense. Since the policy behind a
guest statute is to protect defendants and insurers from liability in guest
passenger suits, and since the effect of imposing liability in such a suit is
felt by the defendant and the insurer only in the defendant's home state,
that state has a real interest in applying its guest statute to protect resi-
dent defendants and their insurers. Conversely, since the effect of impos-
ing liability on a nonresident defendant and insurer in a guest passenger
suit will not be felt by the defendant or insurer in the guest statute state,
that state has no interest in applying its guest statute in favor of that
defendant. The nonresident defendant is not being treated differently
solely because he or she is a nonresident, but because the fact of resi-
dency is relevant to the matter in issue. In view of the policies embodied
in a guest statute, a state's interest in applying its guest statute to imple-
ment those policies exists when the defendant is a resident but does not
exist when the defendant is a nonresident. Thus, the resident defendant
and the nonresident defendant are not similarly situated with respect to
the matter in issue-the application of the forum's guest statute-and
there is a reasonable basis for the different treatment of residents and
nonresidents. The denial of the benefit of the forum's guest statute to
the nonresident defendant, therefore, does not constitute discrimination
against nonresidents within the meaning of the privileges and immunities
clause.'
In this regard, it is of no significance that the nonresident defendant is
from a state that does not have a guest statute. The nonresident defen-
dant is not being denied the benefit of the guest statute defense because
his home state does not have a guest statute. It does not matter, there-
fore, as Dean Ely says, that "it is not sufficient under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to treat people as the laws of their home state would
treat them.' 177 The constitutional question relates to the assertion of the
176. I think it highly doubtful in any event that the Court, which has been unwilling to
interpret the due process and full faith and credit clauses as imposing any significant limita-
tions on the power of state courts to make choice of law decisions, see the discussion in
Sedler, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 91, at 68-74, will find such limitations inher-
ing in the privileges and immunities clause or the equal protection clause. See the discussion
of this point in Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided for Case: Reflections on
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 143-49 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sedler,
Interstate Accidents].
177. Ely, supra note 19, at 186.
630 [Vol. 34
INTEREST ANALYSIS
defense under the forum's guest statute." 8 The nonresident defendant is
being denied the defense under the forum's guest statute because the pol-
icy reflected in that law will not be advanced by its application to a case
involving this defendant. Since the different treatment of residents and
nonresidents with respect to the applicability of the forum's guest statute
is justifiable on the ground that the resident and nonresident defendants
are not similarly situated with respect to the matter in issue, there is no
violation of the privileges and immunities clause.
Dean Ely's attempt to 'unconstitutionalize' interest analysis as a basic
approach to choice of law, therefore, must fail on its own terms. Even
assuming, as Dean Ely says, that Austin stands for the proposition that it
is not sufficient under the privileges and immunities clause to treat peo-
ple as the laws of their home state would treat them, the nonresident
defendant is not being denied the benefit of the forum's guest statute on
the ground that the defendant's home state does not recognize guest-host
immunity. The nonresident defendant is being denied the benefit of the
forum's guest statute on the ground that the policy reflected in that stat-
ute will not be advanced by its application in the case of this defendant.
In any event, there is no violation of the privileges and immunities clause
to begin with unless there has been different treatment of nonresidents
who are similarly situated to residents with respect to the matter in issue.
Since nonresidents are not similarly situated to residents with respect to
the forum's interest in applying its guest statute in order to implement
the policy reflected in that law, the forum may, consistent with the privi-
leges and immunities clause, limit the application of its guest statute to
resident defendants.
As Dean Ely goes on in his discussion of the question of whether states
have an unusual interest in protecting their own, he runs into some diffi-
culty, because it turns out that in some instances, at least as regards the
result he favors, he is willing to concede to a state a greater interest in
protecting its own. In discussing the unprovided-for case, he concludes
that he favors a rule that would look to the law of the situs rather than
that of the forum, in essence the third rule of Neumeier v. Kuehner.7 9 As
in Neumeier, this means that since the accident involving a New York
defendant and an Ontario plaintiff occurred in Ontario, Ontario law de-
nying recovery would apply. The Ontario plaintiff would not have the
benefit of New York law, which allows recovery, although, as Babcock
holds, if a New York plaintiff were injured by a New York defendant in
178. If the defendant were from a guest statute state, there would be no conflict of laws
on the issue of guest-host immunity, but the defendant would be asserting the defense
under the guest statute of the defendant's home state.
179. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972); Ely, supra note 19, at 206,
213-17.
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Ontario, New York law allowing recovery would apply. 8 0 Currie con-
tended that the denial of recovery to the Ontario plaintiff in these cir-
cumstances would violate the privileges and immunities clause,' and Ely
concedes that if he is correct in his interpretation of Austin, the denial of
recovery here would be unconstitutional."' 2 As I have discussed elsewhere,
I, too, think that the denial of recovery in Neumeier was improperly dis-
criminatory, although I do not think that the discrimination reached con-
stitutional dimensions.183 In any event, Dean Ely has sanctioned a choice
of law result that would allow the forum to favor its own.
Dean Ely's objection to the forum's favoring its own breaks down com-
pletely-although he tries to salvage it somewhat-when two parties from
a nonrecovery state are involved in an accident in a recovery state. Here,
Dean Ely favors application of the law of common domicile to deny recov-
ery." Let us consider how such a result relates to the forum's favoring its
own. If a defendant from a nonrecovery state is involved in an accident
with a recovery state plaintiff in the latter's home state, the plaintiff will
bring suit in the home state, which, in this case of true conflict, will apply
its own law and allow the plaintiff to recover.' When two parties from a
nonrecovery state are involved in an accident in a recovery state, the
plaintiff will sue in the state of injury, because if suit is brought in the
home state, that state will apply its law denying recovery."s
In my view, the state where the accident occurs has no real interest in
applying its law to allow recovery since the consequences of the accident
and of allowing or denying recovery will be felt in the parties' home
state. "'8 7 The different treatment of the nonresident plaintiff, who cannot
recover against the nonresident defendant, and the resident plaintiff, who
can, is again justified because in the latter instance the forum has a real
interest in applying its law to allow recovery and in the former instance it
180. See supra text accompanying note 2.
181. Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of
Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323, 1323-25 [445, 445-48] [hereinafter
cited as Currie & Schreter, Privileges and Immunities].
182. Ely, supra note 19, at 211 n.94.
183. Sedler, Interstate Accidents, supra note 176.
184. Ely, supra note 19, at 208-09.
185. Such a case has never arisen in practice, perhaps because the result is so obvious.
186. See, e.g., Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); DeFoor v. Lematta, 249
Or. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966).
187. See the discussion in Sedler, Judicial Method is "Alive and Well": The Kentucky
Approach to Choice of Law in Interstate Automobile Accidents, 61 Ky. L.J. 378, 382-83
(1973). Thus, I agree with Dean Ely when he says that the interest of the state of injury in
applying its law to allow recovery in this situation "seem[s] speculative, at least to me, when
compared with the interest of the parties' home state ... in seeing to it that 'its' guests not
collect from 'its' hosts in cases of ordinary negligence." Ely, supra note 19, at 208-09.
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does not.' 8 In this situation, however, a number of courts have allowed
recovery, sometimes evidencing a concern for the evenhanded treatment
of nonresidents.'
This result, particularly when it is premised on a concern for even-
handedness, should please Dean Ely, but it does not. He favors the appli-
cation of the law of the common domicile to deny recovery, although as
he notes, if his interpretation of Austin is correct-or as he puts it, if
Austin is "accepted as written"-the application of the law of the com-
mon domicile to deny recovery would be unconstitutional.1 90 Dean Ely,
however, concludes: "Applying the law of the common domicile when no
other state is substantially interested-which means, of course, that one
local will win and another will lose-seems at least in some cases, so sen-
sible it's hard to conclude it violates even our small c constitution." " '
As pointed out above, for the recovery state to deny recovery to a non-
resident plaintiff against a nonresident defendant means that the recov-
ery state is favoring its own, since if a resident plaintiff had been injured
by a nonresident defendant from a nonrecovery state, the forum would
apply its law enabling the resident plaintiff to recover. Dean Ely says:
[Alt least on a comparative basis, it seems less offensive to any "spirit of
our constitution" to apply to a suit between two people the law of the
joint domicile . . . than it does to build a choice-of-law system on the
notion that each individual carries around with him his home state's law,
which will be presumptively applicable to his case (assuming it favors
him) irrespective of whom he gets involved in litigation with.'
Interest analysis, of course, does not mean that "each individual carries
around with him his home state's law.' 93 It means in this context that
when a law reflects a compensatory or protective policy, the only state
interested in applying its law to implement that policy is a party's home
state, since it is there that the consequences of allowing recovery or im-
posing liability will be felt. If it is sensible to apply the law of the com-
mon domicile when it is the only interested state, even though the effect
is that the forum will be favoring its own, then why is it not equally sensi-
188. On this basis, Currie concluded that the forum was not improperly discriminating
against the nonresident plaintiff in this situation although it would allow recovery to a resi-
dent plaintiff injured in the forum by a nonresident defendant from a nonrecovery state.
Currie & Schreter, Privileges and Immunities, supra note 181, at 1366 [495].
189. See the discussion and review of cases in Sedler, Rules, supra note 4, at 1035. In my
view, these decisions simply reflect the forum's preference for its own 'better law.'
190. Ely, supra note 19, at 211 n.94.
191. Id. at 211. By "small c constitution," he is referring to constitutional values such as
the nondiscrimination value rather than to constitutional doctrine.
192. Id. (emphasis in original).
193. Id.
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ble to deny the foreign defendant the benefit of the forum's guest statute
when the forum has no interest in extending such protection and when
the only state interested in extending such protection-the defendant's
home state-does not do so? In both instances, the forum is favoring its
own, and it is not extending the benefit of its law to the nonresident
party-in one case to allow recovery and in the other case to deny recov-
ery-because it has no interest in doing so. It would seem rather irrele-
vant in this regard that in one case no resident party is involved and that
in the other case there is a resident party. In both cases, it is the nonresi-
dent party who is being denied the benefit of the forum's law, and in both
cases, the effect of such denial is that the forum is favoring its own.
It turns out, then, that Dean Ely's objection to the forum's favoring its
own is somewhat undercut by his willingness, at least in some cases, to
allow such a result. While he objects in theory to the proposition that a
state's compensatory policies extend only to residents, he approves of re-
sults that have just that effect. He has shown no valid basis for distin-
guishing between the failure to extend a state's compensatory policies to
nonresidents and the failure to extend a state's protective policies to non-
residents, as in the guest statute example. In both instances the reason
for the refusal to extend the benefit of the forum's law to the nonresident
party is the same: the forum has no real interest in doing so, but it
would have such an interest if a resident party were involved. Dean Ely,
then, has not only failed to demonstrate that limiting a state's compensa-
tory and protective policies to residents is violative of the privileges and
immunities clause, but he has conceded that at least sometimes it pro-
duces a sensible result.
It is abundantly clear that interest analysis is not premised on a state's
interest in protecting its own. Nor does interest analysis proceed on the
assumption that "states are interested in applying their rules so as to
generate victories for their own people in a way that they are not inter-
ested in generating victories for others."'4 The basic premise of interest
analysis is that choice of law decisions should be made with reference to a
state's interest in applying its law in order to implement the policy re-
flected in that law. When the policy reflected in that law is a regulatory or
admonitory one, application of the law to implement that policy fre-
quently will result in generating a victory for a nonresident over a resi-
dent. When the policy reflected in a law is a compensatory or protective
one, a state's interest in applying its law to implement that policy usually
is predicated on a party's residence in that state. That interest, therefore,
is necessarily absent when the party claiming the benefit of the state's
law is a nonresident. If denying the nonresident the benefit of the state's
194. Id. at 178.
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law means that the state is favoring its own, this is not because interest
analysis is structurally designed to favor residents over nonresidents, but
because in the particular circumstances the state has a real interest in
applying its law when a'resident party is involved and has no real interest
in doing so when a nonresident party is involved. Interest analysis, as a
basic approach to choice of law, in no way distinguishes between residents
and nonresidents. Thus, Dean Ely's constitutionally-based criticism of
interest analysis as an approach to choice of law has been demonstrated
to be completely unwarranted.
II. INTEREST ANALYSIS IN THE REAL WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL RESPONSE
TO THE 'NEW CRITICS'
In the preceding section of this article I have dealt with the 'new crit-
ics' on their own terms. I have responded to their criticisms of interest
analysis as a basic approach to the resolution of conflicts problems and
have tried to demonstrate that those criticisms are not well-founded. In
the case of Professor McDougal, the criticism proceeds on what I believe
is a mistaken view about the purpose of conflicts law in our legal system
and the role of a court in deciding a conflicts case. In the case of Profes-
sor Brilmayer, the criticism simply misapprehends the nature of the in-
terest analysis approach and the way it operates. Thus, the criticism is
constructed on a completely inaccurate premise. In the case of Dean Ely,
there is also a complete misunderstanding of the basic premise of interest
analysis and a confusion between a state's interest in applying its law in
order to implement the policy reflected in that law and the matter of a
state's generating victories for its own people. He simply fails to realize
that interest analysis as a basic approach to choice of law does not struc-
turally distinguish between residents and nonresidents and, therefore,
that a state's interest in protecting its own is no part whatsoever of inter-
est analysis.
In the present section of this Article, I want to develop what I consider
to be the strongest justification for interest analysis and the best response
to the critics, new and old. That justification is an empirical one. Interest
analysis is the preferred approach to resolving conflicts problems be-
cause it works. More than any other approach to choice of law, interest
analysis facilitates the court's role in a conflicts case because it provides
functionally sound and fair solutions to the choice of law issues that arise
in actual cases. It is for this reason that interest analysis is the approach
that is in fact applied by the courts in practice regardless of the particu-
lar modern approach that they are purportedly following.1"
195. For a more complete discussion of this point, see the articles cited supra note 5.
1983] 635
MERCER LAW REVIEW
Interest analysis will generally produce functionally sound and fair re-
sults in practice because it simplifies the choice of law process by focus-
sing on what the courts consider to be the most rational consideration in
making choice of law decisions: the policies reflected in a state's rule of
substantive law and a state's interest in applying its law to implement
those policies in the particular case. 96 When an analysis of the policies
and interests of the states involved reveals that only one state has a real
interest in having its law applied in the particular case, it seems proper to
a court, concerned with achieving a functionally sound and fair result in
the particular case, to apply the law of the only interested state.' By the
same token, when the forum has a real interest in applying its own law in
a particular case in order to implement the policies reflected in that law
and the application of the forum's law is not fundamentally unfair to the
other party, applying the forum's law to advance its own policies and in-
terests also seems to the court to produce a functionally sound and fair
result. Since, as discussed previously, the courts consider their role in a
conflicts case to be to achieve a functionally sound and fair result in the
case before them and since it is interest analysis that best facilitates the
achievement of such a result, it should not be surprising that in practice
it is interest analysis that is in fact applied by the courts.
Before dealing with the results reached by the courts in practice in re-
lation to the criticisms of interest analysis as a basic approach to choice
of law, I want to say something further about the matter of governmental
interests in private litigation. As I have pointed out elsewhere,'98 interest
analysis is not intended to turn conflicts law into a public law matter.
The focus of interest analysis as a basic approach to choice of law is still
on the litigants who are before the court. The interest analysis approach
merely means that the choice of law decision in a case involving private
litigants is made with reference to the policies and interests reflected in
the differing laws of the states involved. When the policy behind a state's
law would be advanced by its application in the particular case, the party
who would benefit from the application of the law is deemed entitled to
invoke such benefit in the choice of law context. While a state as such
may indeed have an interest in the outcome of litigation between private
parties,' " the premise of interest analysis as an approach to choice of law
is not that the purpose of conflicts law is to advance a state's governmen-
196. See supra note 31.
197. See the discussion in Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5, at
186-87.
198. Id. at 191-92.
199. Id. This interest appears with respect to regulatory and protective laws, that are
aimed at 'social engineering,' in which the state may be relying on the private persons whose
interests are affected by those laws to implement the social engineering policy.
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tal interest. It is, rather, that a consideration of the policies and interests
of the states involved is the most rational and functionally sound method
of resolving the choice of law issues that are presented in litigation be-
tween private parties.
Currie perhaps put too much emphasis in some places on the interest of
the state as such in having its law applied in order to implement the poli-
cies reflected in that law. This appears particularly in regard to his argu-
ment in favor of the application of the forum's own law in the true con-
flicts situation. Currie contended that the court could not properly weigh
interests in the case of the true conflict and said that the determination
of which state had the greater interest was a political function of a very
high order that should not be committed to courts in a democracy." °
Here, perhaps Currie somewhat overstated the case.2 '01 The role of the
court in a conflicts case, as we have said, is to achieve a functionally
sound and fair result in the case before it. Just as the court's role is not to
"promote multistate policies,"202 neither is its role to advance the policies
and interests of the forum. A court would not be acting in a politically
improper way if it adopted a solution to the true conflict other than the
application of the forum's own law.
0 3
I maintain that the forum should apply its own law in the case of the
true conflict because it is reasonable for the forum to resolve the true
conflict in this manner and because in practice the results produced by
this method of resolution are functionally sound and fair to the parties.
As I have stated:
In practice, courts tend to see a conflicts case as essentially a domestic
case with a foreign element added; when the same reasons that call for
200. Currie, Methods and Objectives, supra note 31, at 176 [182-83].
201. It must be remembered that Currie developed interest analysis against the back-
ground of the traditional rules approach of the original Restatement, which was being fol-
lowed by all courts at that time. As an advocate for a completely different approach, he
understandably tended toward overstatement. His tragically early death prevented his fur-
ther refinement of that approach. It is that refinement that has been undertaken by his
adherents.
202. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
203. On this point I need to clear up some confusion that may have been generated by
an earlier statement. I previously said that I advocated application of the forum's own law
in the true conflict because "in a conflict case the proper function of a court is to advance its
own policies and interests rather than to advance 'multistate policies.' " Sedler, Governmen-
tal Interest Approach, supra note 5, at 227. The confusion resulted from my use of the term
"proper function." What I meant by "proper function," as I went on to say, was that "[iut is
clearly legitimate for a court to decide that the implementation of that policy [the policy
reflected in its own law] is more important than implementation of 'multistate policies.'"
Id. I did not mean to imply that a court would be acting improperly in any sense if it
adopted a solution to the true conflict other than the application of its own law.
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the application of their law in a domestic case are -equally present in a
conflicts case, they naturally enough want to apply their own law.
204
In other words, whenever the forum has a real interest in applying its own
law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, applying the
forum's law seems to the court to produce a functionally sound and fair
result in the particular case. I also have noted that in practice, when
courts have purported to apply "objective criteria" to the resolution of
the true conflict, they have tended to skew the criteria to favor the appli-
cation of their own law.2" 5 For these reasons, I, like Currie, advocate the
application of the forum's own law in the true conflict situation.2 In
practice, the courts almost invariably do S0.207
I want now to come back to the matter of achieving functionally sound
and fair results in particular cases. Critics of interest analysis almost al-
ways focus on the alleged deficiencies in the underlying theory and use a
lot of hypothetical examples to illustrate the alleged deficiencies. They
rarely criticize, however, the results in actual cases. They tend to focus on
the theory and say that if the theory is unsound, it does not matter what
results are in fact produced by the application of interest analysis.2 08 I
submit, however, that the validity of interest analysis as a basic approach
to choice of law depends on the results produced by the application of the
approach and that if the results are good, the 'theory' must be pretty
good, too. If the courts are in fact applying interest analysis in prac-
tice-and this point has not really been disputed-and if the courts are
reaching functionally sound and fair results in the cases coming before
them for decision, then the validity of interest analysis as a basic ap-
proach to choice of law, I submit, has been empirically demonstrated. If
that validity has been empirically demonstrated, then in the real world
interest analysis must be considered the preferred approach to finding
204. Id. at 227.
205. Id. at 232.
206. It is on this point that other adherents of interest analysis, of whom Professor
Weintraub is the most prominent, disagree and have proposed solutions to the true conflict
other than the application of the forum's own law. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 270-76, 372-82 (2d ed. 1980). For an analysis of Weintraub's solutions in
tort cases, see Seidelson, Interest Analysis: The Quest for Perfection and the Frailties of
Man, 19 DuQ. L. REv. 207 (1981). Professor Kay, on the other hand, shares my view that in
the case of the true conflict, the forum should apply its own law in order to implement the
policy reflected in that law. Kay, supra note 14, at 614-17.
207. See Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5, at 231-33. For a discus-
sion of the California Supreme Court's decision in Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil
Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978), to displace its own law in a true
conflict, see Sedler, Reflections, supra note 9, at 1629 n.5, and works cited therein.
208. See the discussion of this point in Hay, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodol-
ogy, 32 Hastings L.J. 1644, 1685-86 (1981).
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solutions to problems that require a choice of law.
There seems to be little dispute that the courts are generally reaching
functionally sound and fair results in the cases coming before them for
decision. As Professor Leflar has observed:
The fact is that most American courts today are moving to what they call
"the" new law of conflict of laws. It is a conglomerate, and not a bad one.
In terms of location, this body of law is being lifted up by the courts to a
well-watered plateau high above the sinkhole it once occupied. No loca-
tion lasts forever, and there are vistas beyond the plateau, but it is a rest
stop now.2 09
By functionally sound and fair results, I mean results that are acceptable
in the sense that they do not produce unfairness to the litigants in the
particular case and do not require the application of the law of a state in
circumstances in which the application of such law would be considered
objectively unreasonable. Courts can disagree about the result in a partic-
ular conflicts case, as they can disagree about the result in any other case,
and there could be more than one outcome in a particular conflicts case
that would be considered to be functionally sound and fair. My point is
simply that the results that the courts do reach in practice, when it is
clear that they are in fact applying interest analysis, are functionally
sound and fair results.
I have gone through the writings of the new critics carefully to find
actual cases supporting their claim that application of interest analysis
produces what they consider to be an improper result. In Professor Mc-
Dougal's view, the court achieves an improper result in any case in which
it does not employ 'comprehensive interest analysis,' so we would not ex-
pect him to take issue with the result in a particular case more so than in
any other. We would, however, expect to find such examples in the writ-
ings of Professor Brilmayer and Dean Ely. We would expect them to
demonstrate that interest analysis has produced what they consider to be
improper results in actual cases, but they do not do so. In fact, in both of
their writings there is relatively little discussion of actual cases. Their em-
phasis is on the alleged theoretical deficiencies in interest analysis, and
they use hypothetical cases-which have not arisen in practice and are
not likely to do so-to illustrate those alleged deficiences.
209. Leflar, supra note 5, at 26. Professor Leflar maintains that the courts "follow a
pattern of multiple citation, seldom relying solely upon any single modern choice-of-law
theory, but combining two or more of the theories to produce results which, interestingly,
can be sustained under any or nearly all of the new non-mechanical approaches to conflicts
law." Id. at 10. While the pattern of multiple citation does take place in practice, it is only
the interest analysis approach that can consistently explain the results in these cases. This
is why I contend that it is the interest analysis approach that the courts are in fact applying
in practice.
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Professor Brilmayer does discuss Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,'210 but
only for the purpose of introducing a rather implausible variation of that
case. "1 ' She does not indicate any disagreement with the result in Bern-
hard itself. It cannot be disputed that the application of California law by
the California court in that case produced a functionally sound and fair
result. California had a real interest in applying its law in order to imple-
ment both the compensatory and admonitory policies reflected in that
law. The application of California law was fully foreseeable to the Nevada
tavern, which was close to the California border and which actively solic-
ited California customers.2" Because of California's real interest in apply-
ing its own law and because of the absence of unfairness to the Nevada
defendant, it was fully reasonable for California to apply its law on the
issue of dram shop act liability in that case.
There is no utility in speculating on how the Nevada court would or
should have decided this case because the case would never arise in Ne-
vada. The plaintiff in such a situation would always sue in California,
obtaining jurisdiction under the California long-arm act21 s in the quite
realistic expectation that in this case of true conflict, California would
apply its own law. Critics of interest analysis especially decry the view
that in the case of a true conflict, each state should apply its own law, and
they are looking for solutions that will produce the same result regardless
of where suit is brought. I think that this concern for the same result
regardless of where suit is brought is quite misplaced. In the real world,
particular suits will be brought in particular states with reference to the
likely choice of law and substantive result, and if the plaintiff cannot ob-
tain jurisdiction over the defendant in a favorable forum, he may not
bring suit at all."1' Our inquiry, therefore, should focus on whether the
courts reach functionally sound and fair results in the cases that actually
arise in practice. Just as we should not be looking for ideal solutions to
hypothetical cases that will never arise in the real world, we should not be
looking for the same solutions to particular cases that will only be
brought in one state. A case like Bernhard would only be brought in Cali-
fornia, and the question with which we should be concerned is whether
the California court reached a functionally sound and fair result in that
210. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
211. See the discussion supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
212. See the discussion supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
213. On the constitutionality of California's exercise of jurisdiction under its long-arm
act in this situation, see supra note 95. The same 'foreseeability' factors that make the
application of California substantive law in this case reasonable and hence constitutional
also make it 'fundamentally fair' for California to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the
out-of-state defendant in this case.
214. See supra note 158.
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case. If it is conceded that the court did and if the court was in fact ap-
plying interest analysis,"' then Bernhard is a case that empirically sup-
ports the validity of interest analysis as a basic approach to choice of law.
The same empirical support is furnished by numerous other cases in
which the courts in fact applied interest analysis and in which it is con-
ceded that the courts reached a functionally sound and fair result.216 I do
not mean to suggest that some critics of interest analysis do not some-
times point to actual cases in which they contend that the application of
that approach has produced an improper result.2" My point is that, on
the whole, it has not been contended that in practice the courts are reach-
ing functionally unsound or unfair results in the cases coming before
them for decision. If the courts are actually applying interest analysis to
resolve the choice of law issues in these cases and if the results of such
application are not being challenged, then the validity of interest analysis
as a basic approach to choice of law has been empirically demonstrated.
This brings me to Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.2" While most com-
mentaries on Allstate have dealt with the constitutional significance of
the case, 9 practically every commentator has disagreed with the choice
of law decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.2 2 Although the Minne-
sota Supreme Court explicitly follows Leflar's choice-influencing consider-
ations, as it did in Allstate, in practice its decisions track closely the Cur-
rie version of interest analysis.22"' The critics of interest analysis, then, can
point at least to Allstate as one example in which the application of in-
terest analysis did not produce a functionally sound and fair result.
215. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra
note 5, at 233.
216. On the whole, there has been relatively little criticism of the results that the courts
reach in actual cases. The criticism tends to focus on the rationale of the decisions and on
the possible application of that rationale to hypothetical cases, most of which will never
arise in practice.
217. The Lilienthal case has been the decision most criticized on this basis. See the
discussion supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
218. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
219. Two symposia on Allstate will be found in 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. No. 1 (1981) and 14
U.C.D. L. REV. No. 4 (1981). Other valuable commentaries are Brilmayer, Legitimate Inter-
ests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 1315
(1981); Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. Csi. L. REV. 440 (1982).
220. In Allstate, Justice Stevens, while agreeing that the application of Minnesota law
was not unconstitutional, gratuitously observed that he "regard[s] the Minnesota courts'
decision to apply forum law as unsound as a matter of conflicts law, and there is little in this
record other than the presumption in favor of the forum's own law to support that deci-
sion." 449 U.S. at 331-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
221. The interest analysis, however, was leavened with a preference for the forum's 'bet-
ter law.' See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973). For a discus-
sion of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in conflicts torts cases, see Sedler, Rules,
supra note 4, at 1007-09. In every case, the court applied Minnesota law.
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To the contrary, I submit that the decision of the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Allstate to apply Minnesota law on the issue of 'stacking' did
indeed produce a functionally sound and fair result. A court achieves a
functionally sound and fair result in a conflicts case when the result does
not produce unfairness to the litigants in the particular case and does not
produce the application of the law of a state in circumstances in which
the application of such law would be considered objectively unreasonable.
In Allstate, the application of Minnesota law on the issue of 'stacking'
produced a functionally sound and fair result because: (1) Minnesota
had a real interest in applying its law on this issue in order to implement
the policies reflected in that law, (2) Minnesota's claim to the application
of its law on this issue in the particular case was no less reasonable than
Wisconsin's claim to the application of its law, and (3) the application of
Minnesota law on this issue produced no unfairness to Allstate.
In the first place, it is important to remember that while, from a legal
standpoint, the case involved a conflict between the laws of two sovereign
states, the real world setting of the case was in a functional multistate
area covering parts of both Minnesota and Wisconsin.222 When people
live in a functional multistate area, the state line may be legally real, but
it is not functionally real in the day-to-day lives of the people living
there. Functional multistate areas abound throughout the country and
give rise to many conflicts cases.2 22 While Mr. Hague lived on the Wiscon-
sin side of the state line, he drove one of the insured vehicles every work-
ing day to his place of employment on the Minnesota side of the line, and
after his death his widow moved to Minnesota when she married a Min-
nesota resident. Precisely because Mr. Hague drove into Minnesota every
working day, and doubtless made many other trips there, it was just as
probable that Mr. Hague would be involved in an automobile accident in
Minnesota as it was that he would be involved in an automobile accident
in Wisconsin. There seems to be no dispute that the application of Min-
nesota law on the issue of 'stacking' would have been unexceptional if the
particular accident in which Mr. Hague was killed had occurred in Min-
nesota. 22 ' Since it was just as probable that the accident could have oc-
curred in Minnesota, the application of Minnesota law on the 'stacking'
222. See the discussion of functional multistate areas in Sedler, The Territorial Impera-
tive: Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9 DUQ. L. REv. 394, 399,
407-12 (1971).
223. See, e.g., Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1070 (1980); Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563,
267 A.2d 854 (1970); Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328
(1970).
224. As Justice Powell observed in his dissent: "Under our precedents, it is plain that
Minnesota could have applied its own law to an accident occurring within its borders." 449
U.S. at 336 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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question would not appear to be unreasonable merely because the partic-
ular accident occurred on the Wisconsin side of the line rather than on
the Minnesota side of the line. In other words, the application of Minne-
sota law on the issue of 'stacking' was foreseeable to Allstate not only
because the policy covered Mr. Hague in any state where he was driv-
ing,22 but also because the application of Minnesota law on this issue was
equally foreseeable with the application of Wisconsin law, since it was
equally probable that Mr. Hague would be involved in an accident in ei-
ther state.
Because Mr. Hague drove a vehicle into Minnesota every working day,
it is reasonable for Minnesota to apply its compensatory policy in favor of
Mr. Hague or his beneficiaries, just as it would be if he had been a Min-
nesota resident."' This interest is not predicated on his membership in
the Minnesota workforce,2 7 but on the fact that he was a regular user of
the Minnesota highways and that the matter in issue concerned an auto-
mobile insurance policy covering the vehicles that he regularly drove into
Minnesota. In addition, Minnesota's interest in applying its compensa-
tory policy for the benefit of Mr. Hague's beneficiaries was buttressed by
the widow's subsequent move to Minnesota.2 2 In the circumstances of
this case, then, it was just as reasonable for Minnesota to assert an inter-
est in applying its law on the 'stacking' question as it was for Wisconsin
to assert such an interest. Since it Was reasonable for Minnesota to assert
such an interest here and since the application of Minnesota law pro-
duced no unfairness to Allstate, the application of Minnesota law in the
circumstances of this particular case produced a functionally sound and
fair result. Even the decision in Allstate, then, sometimes criticized as an
extreme example of a state's preference for its own law, cannot be shown
to have produced a functionally unsound or unfair result.
225. This coverage was required under the Wisconsin law regulating automobile liability
insurance policies and under the corresponding laws of every other state.
226. The 'evenhandedness' of Minnesota here should be particularly pleasing to Dean
Ely, in that Minnesota asserted the same interest in applying its law for the benefit of a
nonresident as it did for the benefit of a resident.
227. The plurality and dissenting opinions in Allstate disagreed over whether Minnesota
could assert a legitimate interest in applying its law on this basis. Justice Powell in dissent
maintained that it was irrelevant that the insured's workplace was in Minnesota because
"[n]either the nature of the insurance policy, the events related to the accident, nor the
immediate question of stacking coverage are in any way affected or implicated by the in-
sured's employment status." 449 U.S. at 339 (Powell, J., dissenting).
228. On the relevance of post occurrence changes in interest, see the discussion in Sed-
ler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 5, at 236-42.
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CONCLUSION
Once it is recognized that the purpose of conflicts law in our legal sys-
tem is to provide functionally sound and fair solutions for those relatively
few conflicts cases that arise in practice, the preferred approach to the
resolution of conflicts problems should be the approach that best facili-
tates this purpose. For all the theoretical criticisms of interest analysis as
a basic approach to choice of law, it cannot be denied that in the real
world it is interest analysis that has been applied by the courts and that,
in practice, the courts have generally reached functionally sound and fair
results in the cases coming before them for decision. Therefore, I submit
that the validity of interest analysis as a basic approach to the resolution
of conflicts problems and as the preferred approach to the resolution of
those problems has been empirically demonstrated. And this, I would fur-
ther submit, is the unanswerable response to the critics, 'new' and 'old.'
